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1
Introduction
In order to retain their competitive advantage in the global market, U.S.
organizations have sought out and implemented a variety of process and performance
improvement strategies with the ultimate goals of increased productivity and
enhanced organizational effectiveness. One such improvement effort that has
regained popularity and prominence has been pay for performance. Pay for
performance covers any system that seeks to link pay to some measure of individual,
group or organizational level performance (Brown & Hey wood, 2002). Lawler (1990)
defines pay for performance as “paying individuals predetermined amounts of money
for each unit produced” (p. 57). The use of pay for performance is not a new concept.
In the late 1800’s and early 1900’s, Frederick Taylor used monetary incentives to
improve the productivity of steelworkers (Kanigel, 1997). More than 60 percent of
manufacturers responding to a 1920 National Industrial Conference Board survey
reported using piece rates and 80% of all workers were employed in plants where
piece rates were used (Milkovich & Stevens, 2000, p. 9). However, the prevalence of
these types of programs declined dramatically from the mid 1920s through the mid
1970s due to a variety of complex factors that included the inflation and
mismanagement of performance measures, the rise of the human relations movement
in the 1920s, the severe economic depression in the 1930s, labor unrest, increased
regulation of wages by the government, and union negotiated labor contracts
(Milkovich & Stevens, 2000; Mitchell, Lewin, & Lawler, 1990; Opsahl & Dunnette,
1966; Peach & Wren, 1992). Then, in the 1980s, spurred by the reduction in the
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average productivity growth rate and a decline in the global competitiveness of U.S.
industries, a revitalized interest in alternative pay systems emerged (Blinder, 1990;
Dickinson & Gillette, 1993; Lawler, 1990). In addition, companies began to
implement group-based incentives to initiate changes in the organizational culture,
consistent with the trend toward team-based work environments that occurred during
those years (Honeywell-Johnson & Dickinson, 1999; McAdams & Hawk, 1992).
During the past decade, in response to the increasingly competitive global
market, U.S. organizations began shifting their compensation

systems from

noncontingent to performance contingent pay (Latham & Huber, 1992; Lawler, 1990;
O ’Dell & McAdams, 1987; Wilson, 1995). The performance contingent pay systems
have been adopted in order to align pay with organizational strategies designed to
increase productivity (Abernathy, 1996; Belcher, 1996; Chingos, 1997; Flannery,
Hofrichter, & Platten, 1996; Lawler, 1990, 1995; Risher, 1999; Schuster & Zingheim,
1992; Zingheim & Schuster, 2000). The reason for the changes was the fact that
“traditional patterns of management, organization, and rewards [were] no longer
working” (Wilson, 1995, p. 9); in other words, U.S. companies were losing their
competitive edge.
In 2002, a survey by Hewitt Associates of 1045 U.S. organizations that
included service organizations, manufacturing organizations and multi-industry
organizations, found that 80% of surveyed organizations were using at least one type
of variable pay plan (Hewitt Associates, 2002). This was consistent with results from
the 2001 Hewitt survey when 81% of organizations offered variable pay, and up from
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1995 when 59% of companies had this type of program (Hewitt Associates, 2002).
Another survey by

Towers Perrin

indicated that of 770 North

American

organizations, more than two-thirds had variable pay plans (Anonymous, 2000). In
another study, conducted by the Hay Group, 54% of 500 large and medium U.S.
companies reported that they had begun to change their pay systems to reflect
changes in organizational culture (Flannery et al., 1996). In addition, in that same
study, 73% acknowledged the necessity to alter their pay systems so that they would
be consistent with new cultural initiatives. Similarly, studies from 1986 to 1997
showed “large increases in the percentage of Fortune 1000 firms using a variety of
compensation innovations” (Ledford & Hawk, 2000, p. 28). Thus, not only have a
large number of companies altered their pay systems within the past decade, the trend
appears to be continuing.
Several types of variable pay plans exist. According to the 2002 Hewitt
survey, the most common types of variable pay plans reported by the 1045 surveyed
organizations, were (a) business incentives, 55%
combination

(awards employees for a

of financial operational measures for company, business unit,

department, plant and/or individual performance); (b) special recognition, 52%
(acknowledges outstanding individual or group achievements with small cash awards
or merchandise); (c) individual performance, 47% (rewards based on specific
employee performance criteria); and (d) stock ownership, 40% (rewards stock to
professionals who meet specific goals). Other types of variable pay plans, not
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reported in the Hewitt survey include profit sharing, gain sharing, pay-for-knowledge
or skill, employee stock ownership, and merit pay.
O f the above-mentioned pay plans, only four use a predetermined formula to
tie compensation to objective internal operational or economic measures: individual
incentives, small group incentives, profit-sharing, and gain-sharing (Abernathy, 1990;
McAdams & Hawk, 1992). Although some refer to other types of variable pay plans
as pay for performance or performance contingent pay plans, in the absence of an
announced formula based on objective measures, pay cannot truly be contingent on
performance (Abernathy, 1990; Honey well-Johnson & Dickinson, 1999; Mitchell et
al., 1990). Only the four performance contingent pay plans will be further discussed
and analyzed.
Profit-sharing and gain-sharing link compensation to the performance of a
department, division or organization, and not to individual performance (Abernathy,
1990; Caruth & Handlogten, 2001; Honeywell-Johnson & Dickinson, 1999; Lawler,
1990). Gain-sharing plans, also called cost savings plans, are based on the principle
that cost-reduction is a cooperative effort and any resulting savings should be shared
between the organization and the employees. Gain-sharing bonuses are typically
distributed monthly, quarterly, annually, or are placed in a retirement savings plan
(Caruth & Handlogten, 2001). Profit-sharing plans are utilized in the hope that
em ployees will becom e m ore conscious o f using their tim e effectively and will also

become more conscious of costs in general. Profit-sharing bonuses are usually
calculated annually and distributed on an annual basis or placed in retirement plans
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(Caruth & Handlogten, 2001). From a motivational perspective, the extra pay
resulting from gain-sharing or profit-sharing plans is too delayed from an individual’s
day-to-day performance to have much, if any, affect on it. Furthermore, given the size
of the group included in the plan, there is little relation between an individual’s dayto-day performance and the amount of the bonus. It is difficult, if not impossible, for
an individual to determine how his/her daily performance contributed to the critical
measure, and even more so to the amount of the bonus. In contrast, individual and
small group incentive systems tie the worker’s pay to the worker’s performance
(Abernathy, 1990; Honeywell-Johnson & Dickinson, 1999; Lawler, 1990).
Individual incentives are based only on the performance of the employee; they
are not affected by the performance of others. The defining feature of individual
incentive systems is as follows: employees receive “a predetermined amount of
money for every unit of work they produce” (Wilson, 1995, p. 115). In addition,
individual incentives have three additional characteristics that are common to other
effective rewards and consequences as well: (a) they are based on clearly specified
behaviors or outputs, (b) they are certain (if the behavior or output occurs, employees
will receive the extra compensation), and (c) they are distributed as soon after the
performance as possible, usually in the employee’s regular paycheck (Bucklin &
Dickinson, 2001). Compensation experts (Conrad, 1994; Lawler, 1990, 1992;
McCoy, 1992; McNally, 1988) and behavioral psychologists (Braksick, 2000; Brown,
1982; Daniels & Daniels, 2004; O ’Brien & Dickinson, 1982) alike have emphasized
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the importance of these characteristics when the goal of an intervention program is to
influence work performance.
Group incentives are based on both the performance of the employee and the
performance of others in the employee’s designated group. Lawler (1995) defines
group performance incentive plans as plans that “reward workers for their group and
team performance” (p. 17). He also states that the “primary objectives behind linking
pay to group performance include motivating group members to focus on group goals
and to perform effectively” (p. 18). In contrast to individual incentives, group
incentives are affected by the performance of others in the group. However, they also
have several features in common with individual incentives in that they are (a) based
on clearly specified behaviors or outputs, (b) certain, and (c) distributed in the
employee’s regular paycheck (Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001). W ith respect to the
effectiveness of group incentives, the size of the group is considered to be an
important factor (Blinder, 1990; Honey well-Johnson & Dickinson, 1999; Honeywell,
Dickinson, & Poling, 1997; Lawler, 1990). As the group size increases, the capacity
of an individual employee to control his or her wages decreases, thus weakening the
link between their performance and pay.
During the past decade, organizations have increasingly implemented work
groups and work teams in order to increase productivity and to enhance
organizational effectiveness (Dulebohn & Martocchio, 1998). Concurrently, there has
been a trend among employers to adopt performance incentives that reward workers
for the work group and team performance. Surveys conducted over the same period
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consistently reported that 12%-16% of U.S. companies used small group incentives
(Honeywell et al., 1997). And, in 1992, Peterson identified six manufacturing
industries in which at least 50% of employees were covered by group plans. Although
individual incentives are more prevalent, the use of group incentives is increasing
(Honeywell-Johnson & Dickinson, 1999). In a 1994 Hay Group survey, 39% of
respondents who did not use group incentives indicated that they were considering
them (Gross, 1995). Similarly, Ledford and Hawk (2000) reported that Fortune 1000
firms increased their use of group incentives by 50% between 1987 and 1996. With
respect to evaluations of effectiveness, in one survey, 75% of the 185 companies who
used small group incentives reported positive effects (O’Dell & McAdams, 1987). In
another survey, 81% reported favorable reactions by employees, and 67% reported
bottom-line improvements (McCoy, 1992). In spite of the growth in the use of group
incentive plans, longitudinal research of the Fortune 1000 organizations by Lawler,
Mohrman, and Ledford (1995) found that many firms are uncertain about the
effectiveness of their group incentive plans (Dulebohn & Martocchio, 1998).
Contributing to this uncertainty is a lack of controlled research that has examined
performance rewards, such as work group incentives, being adopted by companies
(Dulebohn & Martocchio, 1998).
Individual Incentives and Group Incentives
In the absence of incentive plans, the link between an employee’s
performance and his/her compensation is often tenuous at best and nonexistent at
worst. Employees may simply put in their time and receive their pay. Under
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conventional compensation systems (i.e., hourly pay or salary pay), significant
differences in employee performance may not be recognized, or if they are
recognized,

may not be rewarded proportionally.

Because

incentives relate

performance directly to pay, differences in employee performance can be identified
precisely and rewarded accordingly (Caruth & Handlogten, 2001). Moreover, the
stronger the link between performance and pay, the higher the performance.
Individual incentives provide the strongest link between performance and pay,
because incentives are based solely on the performance of the individual. W ith group
incentives, because a worker’s pay depends on the group’s performance, his/her
control over earnings decreases as the group size increases. Even though large group
incentives may not effectively influence a worker’s performance, small group
incentives may (Honeywell et al., 1997). In small groups, workers can substantially
influence the group’s performance, thereby increasing or decreasing their own
earnings. Therefore, they may perform as well when they receive small group
incentives as when they receive individual incentives (Honeywell-Johnson &
Dickinson, 1999; Honeywell et al., 1997).
Individual Incentives
Laboratory and field studies have consistently demonstrated that individual
incentives increase performance in comparison to hourly pay (e.g., Allison,
Silverstein, & Galante, 1992; Bucklin, McGee, & Dickinson, 2003; Dickinson &
Gillette, 1993; Frisch & Dickinson, 1990; LaMere, Dickinson, Henry, Henry, &
Poling, 1996; London & Oldham, 1977; Riedel, Nebeker, & Cooper, 1988; Smoot &
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Duncan, 1997; Stajkovic & Luthans, 2001).
Given that the general effectiveness of individual incentives had been
established, much of the subsequent research focused on comparing the relative
effectiveness of various types of arrangements of individual incentives. Three
thematic lines of research emerged: Investigations of (a) schedules of incentive
delivery; (b) linear, accelerating, and decelerating piece-rate pay; and (c) percentages
of total or base pay earned in incentive pay (Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001).
In studies that have examined different arrangements between performance
and individual incentives, performance levels have not been functionally related to (a)
the ratio schedule of delivery, (b) linear, accelerating or decelerating piece-rate pay,
or (c) the percentage of total pay and base pay earned in incentive pay. Although not
conclusive, the data from these three lines of research suggest that the main
determinant of productivity is the contingent relationship between performance and
incentives rather than the specific way the incentives are related to performance
(Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001).
Individual Incentives with Individual Feedback
In most of the studies investigating the effects of individual incentives,
performance feedback was a planned component of the incentive system or readily
available due to the nature of the task (Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001). This feedback
typically consisted of specific, daily information about individual performance and
how that performance related to the incentive earned. Such feedback may sustain
performance under different incentive arrangements. In other words, feedback may

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

eliminate any performance differences that would result from different incentive pay
arrangements if it were not present. Whether feedback enhances the effects of
monetary incentives is important from a business perspective. Buyniski (1995)
reported that many organizations do not provide feedback to employees when they
pay them incentives. Thus, if feedback does enhance performance and the
effectiveness of the incentives, organizations could improve employee productivity
by implementing a relatively inexpensive feedback system along with incentive pay
(Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001).
Three studies have examined the effects of monetary incentives with and
without feedback on performance, however, two contained methodological confounds
that made interpretation problematic (Agnew, Dickinson, Acker, Cronin, &
Goldwater, 1992; Smoot & Duncan, 1997). Only one study examined the effects of
individual monetary incentives with and without feedback on performance, while
controlling two variables that were identified as potential confounds in laboratory
studies, the lack of attractive alternative activities and social demands (Bucklin et al.,
2003). These potential confounds relate to differences between actual work settings
and laboratory simulations. W ork settings offer a vast array of attractive off-task
activities that compete, often effectively, with work tasks and the effects of
incentives. Although off-task activities were available to participants in all of the
laboratory studies, they may not have been as attractive as those in a work setting.
W ithout attractive alternatives, participants may spend all of their time engaging in
the experimental task regardless of the specific arrangement between the incentives
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and performance (Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001). In addition, in actual work settings,
performers have the opportunity to engage in off-task activities when the supervisor is
not present. However, in the laboratory studies the experimenter was always present
and this may have restricted the extent to which the participants engaged in off-task
activities.
Agnew et al. (1992) used a within-subject ABA design to assess performance
under (A) monetary incentives only and (B) monetary incentives with performance
feedback. Four participants were hired through a help-wanted advertisement to
perform a computerized data entry task for seven hours a day for four to five weeks.
The monetary incentive system included a guaranteed hourly wage and $0.57 per
correct entry past proficiency level. During feedback phases, the computer displayed
the number of items entered correctly after the second and seventh hour and, at the
end of the session, the researcher graphed the total number of items completed
correctly. The introduction of feedback resulted in inconsistent effects, with only
slight performance improvements for two of the four participants. However, two
methodological flaws, (a) the criterion might have been too high for participants to
earn the incentives, and (b) the sessions were too long and boring as reported by the
participants, make it necessary to interpret these results cautiously.
Smoot and Duncan (1997) compared the effects of three incentive pay
systems (linear piece-rate pay, accelerating piece-rate pay, decelerating piece-rate
pay) and base pay only, with and without performance feedback. W ithin-subject and
between- group comparisons were made to the data from 30 college students who had
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been randomly assigned to six groups. In the baseline condition, all participants were
given base pay. Following baseline, two groups were exposed to linear piece-rate pay
with feedback, two groups were exposed to accelerating piece-rate pay with feedback,
and two groups were exposed to decelerating piece-rate pay with feedback. As the
final phase for one of the two groups exposed to each of the incentive systems (i.e.,
three of the six groups), feedback was removed to examine its supplemental effects.
Performance improved when the feedback was removed, indicating that the feedback
did not provide any supplemental control. In fact, in this study, feedback had a
negative effect on performance. However, two methodological flaws, (a) the feedback
activity required the participant to stop engaging in the experimental task to tally the
parts completed, thus less session time was available for him/her to perform the task,
and (b) the effects of feedback in the previous condition may have carried over to the
incentive without feedback condition, make it necessary to interpret these results
cautiously.
Bucklin et al. (2003) used a within-subject ABAC design to examine
performance under (A) monetary incentives without end-of-session feedback, (B)
monetary incentives with end-of-session performance feedback, and (C) hourly pay
with end-of-session feedback. Participants were seven undergraduate students who
performed a computer simulated work task, SYNWORK (Elsmore, 1994), for three
90-min sessions over 12 - 15 weeks.

During the monetary incentive conditions,

participants received a piece-rate pay of $.10 for every 100 points earned on
SYNWORK. If participants accumulated 7,500 points per session, they received
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$7.50, which was the same amount they received in the hourly pay condition. During
feedback phases, the computer displayed the number of points earned by participants
at the end of each session. No feedback was provided during the session. To control
for the potential confound of the lack alternative activities, during all sessions,
participants had access to alternative computer activities on adjacent computers (email, the Internet, and three computer games). In addition, to control for the potential
confound of social demands, the experimenter was not present during any of the
experimental sessions. Performance improved for six of seven participants when
feedback was added to the monetary incentive condition. Furthermore, for all but one
participant, performance did not change until feedback was provided, lending
credibility to the interpretation that feedback enhanced the effectiveness o f incentives.
Additionally, all participants displayed higher performance when feedback was
combined with incentives than when feedback was combined with hourly pay,
suggesting that monetary incentives do enhance the effects of feedback. Moreover,
for six of the seven participants, performance was considerably higher during the
incentive without feedback condition than during the hourly pay plus feedback
condition. However, performance did not reverse for six of the seven participants
after the feedback was removed, thus the results must be viewed cautiously.
Group Incentives
The effects o f group m onetary incentives have not been as extensively

researched as the effects of individual incentives. In a recent review of the literature,
Honey well-Johnson and Dickinson (1999) stated that, “relatively few experimental
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investigations have examined the effects of group monetary incentives on the
performance of groups that are of the size typically found in the workplace” (p. 116).
Their search of the literature, which excluded survey studies, uncovered only 12
experimental studies, four of which were unpublished. Two additional experimental
studies (Honeywell-Johnson, McGee, Culig, & Dickinson, 2002; Thurkow, Bailey, &
Stamper, 2000) have been published since Honeywell-Johnson and Dickinson (1999)
published their review, bringing the total of known studies to 14. Most of these
studies examined groups having less than 10 members. Only three field studies
examined groups having more than 12 members. Noting the small number of studies,
Dickinson (2000) emphasized the need to conduct additional research, particularly in
light of the fact that group incentive systems are being increasingly adopted by
organizations.
Four of the 14 studies examined the effects of group size on performance
(Campbell, 1952; Marriott, 1949; Roberts & Leary, 1990; Stoneman & Dickinson,
1989), 5 examined the effects of group incentives and hourly pay on performance
(Allison et al., 1992; Farr, 1976; Honeywell-Johnson et al., 2002; Miroff, Naylor,
Lubeach, Greenberg, Gillen, Sitarsky, & Duncan, 1993; Smoot, 1997), 7 compared
group and individual incentives (Allison et al., 1992; Farr, 1976; Honeywell et al.,
1997; Roberts & Leary, 1990; Smoot, 1997; Stoneman & Dickinson, 1989; Thurkow
et al., 2000), and 3 compared cooperative (equally divided) and competitive
(differentially divided) group incentives (Allison et al., 1992; Farr, 1976; Weinstein
& Holzbach, 1973). Only two studies investigated the effects of group incentives on
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high performance (Honeywell-Johnson et al., 2002; London & Oldham, 1977). Five
studies also examined participants’ satisfaction and/or preference of the pay systems
(Allison et al., 1992; Farr, 1976; Honeywell et al., 1997; Honeywell-Johnson et al.,
2002; Thurkow et al., 2000).
Group size. Group incentives are based both the performance of the employee
and the performance of others in the employee’s designated group. In small groups,
workers can substantially influence the group’s performance. However, “as the group
size increases, the capacity of an individual worker to control his or her wages under
group incentives conditions decreases” (Honeywell et al., 1997, p. 262). Blinder
(1990) referred to this as the “ 1/nth problem,” in which “n” represents the number of
employees in the group. As “n” increases, the worker loses control over his or her
wages and hence the effectiveness of group incentives is likely to decrease (Blinder,
1990; Honeywell-Johnson & Dickinson, 1999; Honeywell et al., 1997). An individual
employee retains a certain degree of control over the group’s performance, and his or
her wages when the size of the group is relatively small. Thus, group incentives may
effectively influence performance when the work group is small.
The effects of group size on performance were investigated in four of the
fourteen studies. Only two early field studies (Campbell, 1952; Marriott, 1949)
examined the effects of group incentives on the performance of large groups. In the
first study (Campbell, 1952) study, group size ranged from under 20 to over 100
workers. In the second (Marriott, 1949), groups ranged in size from under 10 to over
50. Workers received incentives based on the group’s total productivity, that is, they
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all received the same amount of incentive. In both studies, performance decreased as
the size of the group increased.
The results of investigations with small groups have differed from the results
reported by Campbell (1952) and Marriott (1949). Stoneman and Dickinson (1989)
and Roberts and Leary (1990) examined the effects of equally divided group
incentives on the performance of groups ranging in size from two to nine members.
The two studies were conducted in laboratory settings and between group
comparisons were utilized. In both studies, the performance of the groups was
comparable regardless of the size of the group.
The most likely reason for the differences in results between the two field
studies and the two laboratory studies is the size of the groups that were examined.
However, Honeywell-Johnson and Dickinson (1999) posited three additional factors
that may have contributed to the differences: (a) the length of exposure to the pay
systems; (b) the amount of the incentives; and (c) differing types of social
interactions. Nonetheless, the results of the four studies suggest that group incentives
are likely to be (a) less effective with large groups than with small groups, and (b)
equally effective with groups having ten and fewer members.
Group incentives versus hourly pay. Five of the 14 studies compared the
effects of small group monetary incentives and hourly pay. Four of the studies were
conducted in a laboratory setting (Farr, 1976; Honeywell-Johnson et al., 2002; Miroff
et al., 1993; Smoot, 1997) and one was conducted in a field setting (Allison et al.,
1992). The results from these studies have been consistent. For groups ranging in size
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from 3 to 12 members, group monetary incentives have resulted in higher levels of
performance

than

hourly pay.

Furthermore,

performance

was

higher when

participants were paid group monetary incentives than when they were paid hourly,
regardless of whether the incentives were equally divided among group members
(Farr, 1976; Honeywell-Johnson et al., 2002; M iroff et al., 1993; Smoot, 1997) or
differentially divided (Farr, 1976).
Group incentives versus individual incentives. Seven studies compared the
effects of equally divided group incentives and individual incentives on performance
(Allison et al., 1992; Farr, 1976; Honeywell et al., 1997; Roberts & Leary, 1990;
Smoot, 1997; Stoneman & Dickinson, 1989; Thurkow et al., 2000). Five of the
studies were conducted in a laboratory setting and two in field settings. The size of
the groups ranged from two to twelve members, with the exception of the Thurkow et
al. (2000) study. In that study, group size varied from session to session with an
average of seven members, but the groups ranged from two to twenty-four members.
In all of the studies, performers received per piece incentives based on their own
performance during the individual incentive condition, and equally divided incentives
based on the pooled performance of the group during the group incentive condition.
However, in one study (Thurkow et al., 2000), the top performer also received an
additional bonus during the group incentive condition.
In five of the seven studies (Farr, 1976; Honeywell et al., 1997; Roberts &
Leary, 1990; Smoot, 1997; Stoneman & Dickinson, 1989), performance was
comparable when workers received equally divided group incentives and individual
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incentives. In one of the two field studies (Allison et al., 1992), performance was
slightly higher when workers received equally divided group incentives. Thus, in six
of the seven studies, the small group incentives were at least as effective as individual
incentives.
In contrast, results from the Thurkow et al. (2000) study differ notably. In that
study, telephone interviewers performed substantially better when they received
individual incentives than when they received equally divided group incentives. The
reason for this disparity is not clear, but one reason could have been the lack of a
clear performance standard during the group incentive condition, when incentives
were dependent upon the group’s performance.exceeding this standard. In addition, it
was difficult for supervisors to give interviewers accurate goals, based on final
person-hours, during the shift because of methodological'problems, e.g., interviewers
failed to report for scheduled shifts, or were tardy. Other possible reasons for the
divergent results are related to group size and composition. Although the results were
based on the performance of six participants, the participants were part of different
sized groups from day to day, depending upon how many other employees were
scheduled to work. Additionally, the average size of the work group was seven
members, but it varied from two to twenty-four members. Thus, the size of the group,
its uncertainty, and/or the changeable group composition from session to session
could explain the superiority of individual incentives in this study. One additional
reason for the differing results that was suggested by the authors, was that the six
participants typically performed higher than other members of their groups (Thurkow
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et al., 2000). Thus, the authors suggested, based on analyses by Dierks and McNally
(1987) and Dickinson and Honeywell-Johnson (1999), that the participants may have
decreased their performance during the group incentive condition because they
received less money in incentives. Based on these methodological flaws, the results of
this study should be interpreted cautiously.
In summary, in six of the seven studies, equally divided small group
incentives were found to be at least as effective as individual incentives for groups
ranging in size from two to twelve members. While Thurkow et al. (2000) reported
that group incentives were not as effective as individual incentives, this finding
appears to be an anomaly. As indicated above, there are several reasons why
Thurkow et al.’s findings may have differed from the findings of the other studies,
including (a) the lack of a clear group goal during the group incentive condition, (b)
the size of the payout group, (c) the changing membership of the group, and (d) the
possibility that the participants were high performers in comparison to the other
workers.
Three of the seven studies that examined equally divided group incentives,
also compared differentially divided (competitive) group incentives with individual
incentives (Allison et al., 1992; Farr, 1976; Thurkow et al., 2000). W hen incentives
are differentially distributed, the amount of incentives that a worker receives is more
dependent on his or her performance. The differentially divided rewards in these three
studies were competitive, that is, when one group member received incentives, it
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decreased the opportunity for other members in the group to receive the same or a
similar amount of incentives.
In one study (Farr, 1976), one group of participants received per piece
incentives for correctly sorting computer cards that were punched with different
patterns of holes. In the differentially divided group incentive condition, the top
performer in a three-person group received 50% of the available incentives, the
middle performer received 33%, and the low performer received 17%. Differentially
divided incentives resulted in higher performance than individual incentives and,
higher performance than equally divided group incentives.
In the Allison et al. (1992) study, workers received incentives based on the
percentage of target behaviors completed during the week. In the individual incentive
condition, incentive pay was calculated by multiplying the percentage of target
behaviors completed by $20.00. In the differentially divided group incentive
condition, pay was calculated by dividing the total amount of incentives available
($200.00) equally among the top three of twelve performers. No significant
differences in performance were observed between differentially divided group
incentives and individual incentives.
In the Thurkow et al. (2000) study, telephone interviewers received hourly
pay and a per survey incentive for each survey completed above a specified goal
during the individual incentive condition. During the competitive incentive condition,
only the top performer received a bonus. The bonus was provided weekly and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

consisted of an extra hour of pay. Performance was substantially higher when
workers were paid individual incentives.
The results of the three studies comparing differentially divided (competitive)
group incentives with individual incentives are inconclusive. In the first study (Farr,
1976) performance was higher when participants received differentially divided
incentives than when they received individual incentives, in the second study (Allison
et al., 1992) performance was comparable, and in the third study (Thurkow et al.,
2000) performance was lower when participants received competitive incentives. It
should be noted that the competitive incentive systems in the above studies differed
considerably from each other and likely contributed to the differing results. Before
definitive conclusions can be made about the relative effectiveness of differentially
divided group incentives versus individual incentives further research is required.
However, because competitive rewards may have long-term detrimental effects as
workers vie for the limited rewards, a number of individuals have argued against their
use in work settings (Daniels, 1994; Honeywell-Johnson & Dickinson, 1999).
The effects o f group incentives on high performance. Two published studies
have investigated the effects of group monetary incentives on high and low
performance (Honeywell-Johnson et al., 2002; London & Oldham, 1977). This topic
of research is important for several reasons. As discussed earlier, in six of seven
studies, equally divided group incentives were just as effective as individual
incentives with groups ranging in size from two to twelve members (Allison et al.,
1992; Farr, 1976; Honeywell et al., 1997; Roberts & Leary, 1990; Smoot, 1997;
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Stoneman & Dickinson, 1989). Honeywell-Johnson and Dickinson (1999) stated that
these results may have been due to the fact that individuals within the group
performed similarly to one another. If participants within a group perform similarly,
the amount of pay they receive under individual and group incentives does not vary
much (Dickinson, 2000). If pay does not vary, then one would not expect
performance to vary either, because the monetary contingencies are essentially the
same for the performer. Thus, when members within a group perform similarly to
each other, individual and group incentives are likely to result in comparable
performance levels.
However, if group members do perform differently from each other, i.e., some
are high and some low performers, group incentives are likely to decrease the
performance of high performers. In 1987, Dierks and McNally argued against group
incentive systems on the basis that high performers would decrease their performance
when they saw their earnings repeatedly decreased by other workers. Dickinson
(2000) concurred, stating that, “decreases in group productivity are most likely to
result when high performers earn less money when paid group incentives and lower
their performance accordingly over time” (p. 5). Poor performers, on the other hand,
would be expected to continue their poor performance when paid group incentives
because their earnings would increase noncontingently (Honeywell et al., 1997). If,
indeed, high performers decreased their performance and low performers did not alter
theirs, group productivity would clearly suffer.
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Four of the seven studies that compared the effects of equally divided and
individual incentives reported individual performance data (Honeywell et al., 1997;
Smoot, 1997; Stoneman & Dickinson, 1989; Thurkow et al., 2000). Individual data
are necessary to determine whether members of the group performed similarly to one
another or differently from one another. The four that provided individual data will be
discussed next, to explore Dickinson’s (2000) contention that if performers within a
group perform similarly, performance is likely to be the same under individual and
group incentives.
Stoneman and Dickinson (1989) examined eight groups ranging in size from
two to nine members. Participants performed comparably when paid group and
individual incentives. In four of the eight groups a clear high performer emerged,
based on visual inspection of the individual data. In three of the four groups, the
performance of the high performer was comparable under individual and group
incentives. In the remaining group, the high performer performed better during the
individual incentive phases. The results from three of the four groups that contained a
clear high performer do not appear to support Dickinson’s (2000) contention that high
performers will decrease their performance over time when paid group incentives.
However, participants were paid only once at the end of the group incentive phase
and thus their performance may not have come under the control of decreased wages.
Additionally, the groups were small (two to five members), and therefore the top
performers still had considerable influence over their own wages.
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Smoot (1997) examined individual and group incentives with six threemember groups, and, similar to Stoneman and Dickinson (1989), found performance
to be comparable when individuals received individual and group monetary
incentives. Because most of the subjects performed comparably to each other within
the groups, the overall results of this study lend support to Dickinson’s (2000)
contention that if group members perform similarly to each other, their performance
is likely to be the same when they are paid individual and group incentives.
Honeywell et al. (1997) examined two 10-person groups. As with the prior
two studies, individuals performed similarly when they were paid individual and
group monetary incentives. However, a more detailed analysis of Honeywell’s data
supports

the

possibility

that

high

performers

decreased

their

performance

(Honeywell-Johnson et al., 2002). When Honeywell et al. (1997) statistically
analyzed their data, they collapsed the data across the two groups of participants.
When the data for the two groups were analyzed separately, however, performance
was statistically significantly lower during the group incentive conditions for one of
the groups. This group contained the highest performers with the highest pay
differentials between the individual and group incentive conditions. These results
prompted Honeywell-Johnson et al. (2002) to state that they warranted further study.
In Thurkow et al.’s (2000) study, individuals performed higher when they
were paid individual incentives than when they received group monetary incentives.
As noted by the authors, an analysis of the individual performance data revealed that
their six participants performed better than the other group members in 67% of the
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sessions. Thus, the participants could be considered high performers and, as stated by
Thurkow et al., “based on Dickinson and Honeywell-Johnson (1999), would be
expected to perform lower during the group incentive sessions” (p. 19).
The data from the preceding studies support the conclusions that (a) when
group members perform similarly to each other, equally divided and individual
incentives will result in similar levels of performance (Honeywell-Johnson et al.,
2002; Smoot, 1997; Stoneman & Dickinson, 1989), and (b) when a group contains
high performers, group incentives may decrease their performance and thus, the
overall productivity of the group (Honeywell-Johnson et al., 2002; Thurkow et al.,

2000).
As stated previously, only two experimental studies have examined the effects
of group monetary incentives on high and low performance (Honeywell-Johnson et
al., 2002; London & Oldham, 1977). London and Oldham (1977) investigated the
performance of 35 two-person groups. The two group members worked in separate
rooms where they sorted cards based on the pattern of holes in the card. Participants
were first exposed to an individual monetary incentive condition in which they
received $0.01 for each card they sorted during a 5-minute session. After this first
session, participants were paid, and one-half of the group was told that they were high
performers, i.e., they were told that they sorted 25% more cards than their partner,
while the other half was told that they were low performers, i.e., they were told that
they sorted 25% fewer cards than their partner. Thus, in each pair, one person
believed that he or she was a high performer while the other believed that he or she
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was a low performer. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of five pay
conditions for three 5-minute sessions; fixed rate pay, the individual incentive
condition or one of three equally divided group monetary incentive systems. Even
though the three group monetary incentive conditions were all equally divided, in one
of the group conditions, the incentive was based on the performance of the high
performer, in the second, the incentive was based on the performance of the low
performer, and in the third, the incentive was based on the average performance of the
both performers. The former two conditions are unique to this study. That is, when
other studies have examined equally divided incentives, the group incentives have
been based on either the average performance of the group members or the pooled
performance of all group members (which equates to the average performance of the
group members). Thus, only the results for participants who were exposed to the
equally divided rewards based on their average performance will be discussed herein.
Readers who are interested in a detailed analysis of all the results are referred to the
original study.
Participants who were told that they were low performers sorted about the
same number of cards when they were paid equally divided group incentives and
when they were paid individual monetary incentives (average = 56.5 cards versus
58.5 cards). However, participants who were told that they were high performers
sorted 16% fewer cards when they were paid equally divided group incentives than
when they were paid individual incentives (average = 58.2 cards versus 69.6).
Statistical analyses were not conducted for the within-subject comparisons, nor were
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the results of between-group analyses reported for individual incentives and equally
divided group incentives, thus these results cannot be considered conclusive and
should be interpreted cautiously (Honeywell-Johnson et al., 2002). Nonetheless, these
data suggest that the performance of high performers will be better when they are
paid individual incentives than when they are paid equally divided group incentives.
Honeywell-Johnson et al. (2002) used a within-subject ABCB design to
examine the effects of individual and group incentives on the performance of high
performers, under (A) hourly pay with individual feedback, (B) individual incentives
with individual feedback, and (C) group incentives with group feedback. Participants
were four college students who performed a computerized simulated work task,
SYNWORK (Elsmore, 1994), on networked computers. Each session was two hours
and each phase lasted between 5-10 sessions. Participants could engage in alternative
activities (email and computer games) on adjacent computers whenever they wanted.
In addition, participants were prompted to take three 5-minute work breaks during the
session.
During the hourly pay condition, participants earned $10.00 per session.
During the individual and group incentive conditions, the amount of money they
received was based on the number of points they earned each session. In the
individual incentive condition, participants received $.10 for every 100 points earned.
At the end of each session, the computer displayed the number of points earned. In
the group incentive condition, participants were told that they were members of a tenperson group and that their incentives would be based on the average performance of
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the group members. Participants received $.10 for every 100 points in the group
average. The groups, however, were simulated. During the group incentive phase, the
group average was calculated so that it was always lower than the point score of the
participant; that is, so the participant would always be a “high performer.” Because of
that, participants earned less money during the group incentive phase than during the
individual incentive phases. During the group incentive condition, the computer
displayed the average group score at the end of each session. The individual’s point
score was not displayed during this condition. In a post-experimental questionnaire,
all four participants indicated that they believed there were, in fact, nine other
members in their group.
The performance of all four participants was appreciably higher during the
individual incentive conditions than during the hourly pay condition. Three of the
four participants performed lower during the group incentive condition than during
the individual monetary incentive condition. The performance of the fourth
participant increased throughout the study, regardless of pay condition. HoneywellJohnson et al. (2002) concluded that the group incentives resulted in lower
performance than the individual incentives, stating, “these data indicate that high
performers are likely to decrease their performance when they are paid small group
monetary incentives” (p. 100).
W hile the results of the studies conducted by London and Oldham (1977) and
Honeywell-Johnson et al. (2002) are suggestive, they are not definitive. As indicated
earlier, the results reported by London and Oldham are problematic due to the lack of
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clarity with respect to the statistical comparisons. In addition, they examined groups
with only two members while in business and industry, group incentives are most
commonly implemented with groups of ten members (Honeywell et al., 1997).
Finally, participants were exposed to the pay conditions for only three 5-minute
sessions. Performance over longer time periods may differ. W ith respect to the
Honeywell-Johnson et al. (2002) study, only four participants served as subjects, and
the performance of one did not decrease during the group incentive phase.
McGee (2004), in an unpublished dissertation, and subsequently, McGee,
Dickinson, Huitema, and Culig (2005), in a follow-up report that included statistical
analyses of the data, extended the work of London and Oldham (1977) and
Honeywell-Johnson et al. (2002). McGee (2004) used a within-subject ABCDC
design to examine the performance of high performers working in 10-person
simulated groups under (A) hourly pay with individual feedback, (B) individual
incentive pay with individual feedback, (C) individual incentive pay with individual
and group feedback, and (D) group incentive pay with individual and group feedback.
By holding the comparative group feedback constant across the individual and group
incentive conditions (the CDC phases), any performance differences that occurred
could be attributed to the pay system itself, rather than to the comparative feedback
indicating that the participant was a high performer. The inclusion of comparative
group feedback in the McGee (2004) study eliminated a confound in previous studies
(Honeywell et al., 2002; London & Oldham, 1977) in which participants were first
exposed to individual incentive pay without comparative group feedback, then
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exposed to group incentive pay with comparative group feedback. Thus, the
comparative group feedback, the group incentive pay, or a combination of both may
have contributed to the observed differences in performance under the individual
incentive pay condition and the group incentive pay condition.
In the McGee (2004) study, participants were 11 college students who
performed a computerized data entry task that was modeled after the job of a bank
proof operator. Each session was 45 minutes and each phase lasted between 5-10
sessions. Alternative tasks (computer games) were available on the computers and
participants could engage in those activities whenever they wanted.
Statistical analyses from the McGee et al. (2005) study revealed that high
performers performed better under both individual incentive pay (phases BC) and
group incentive pay (D) than under hourly pay (A) (p < 0.01). High performers
performed lower when paid group incentives (D) than when paid individual
incentives after exposure to both pay systems (phases CD) although the decrease in
performance was not significant (p > 0.05). However, high performers increased their
performance significantly when switched from the group incentive phase (D) to the
final individual incentive phase (C) (p < 0.01). Moreover, the increase was
considerably greater than the decrease that occurred when the conditions changed
from individual incentive pay to group incentive pay (71 check increase vs. 43 check
decrease). Thus, a history of exposure to both types of pay systems may be necessary
for such performance differences to emerge.
The lower performance during the group incentive with individual and group
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feedback phase (D) appeared to be due to decreases in the amount of money earned
rather than to the comparative feedback they received that indicated they were high
performers for the following reasons. First, when participants were paid individual
incentives they did not decrease their performance when switched from individual
feedback to comparative feedback (phases BC) (p > 0.05). In other words, the
addition of group feedback did not result in significant changes in performance.
Secondly, participants received comparative feedback when they received both
individual and group incentives during the final phases (CDC). Thus, any changes in
performance were likely due to changes in earnings rather than to the comparative
feedback.
Satisfaction and preference o f high performers. Productivity is not the only
concern when analyzing the effects of incentive systems; employee acceptance is
critical to the success of a pay system as well (Honeywell-Johnson & Dickinson,
1999). Moreover, Mawhinney (1984) has argued that organizational interveners have
an ethical responsibility to evaluate employee satisfaction: “We propose to jointly
improve productivity and quality of work life (job satisfaction). But we rarely
measure satisfaction” (p. 27). “Unless the contingencies designed to improve
productivity are patently positive (joy producing), some technology for estimating the
condition it produces in people must be employed” (Mawhinney, 1984, p. 7).
Three studies (Honeywell et al., 1997; Honeywell-Johnson et al., 2002;
McGee, 2004) that examined high performers also reported participants’ satisfaction
with and/or preference for the individual incentive and group incentive systems. In
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Honeywell et al.’s (1997) study, while high performers rated the two types of
incentives similarly, all preferred individual incentives when asked to choose between
them. All four of Honeywell-Johnson et al.’s (2002) high perfprmers indicated that
they preferred the individual incentives and found them to be more satisfying than
either hourly pay or group incentives. Three of the four reported that the group
incentive system was the most stressful. These results suggest that top performers
prefer individual incentives and find group incentives to be more stressful than either
hourly pay or individual incentives. Satisfaction and preference results from M cGee’s
(2004) unpublished dissertation are also similar to those reported by Honeywell et al.
(1997) and Honeywell-Johnson et al. (2002). McGee (2004) reported that the
majority of participants found the individual incentive system to the most preferred (9
of 11 participants) and the most satisfying (8 of 11 participants), and the group
incentive system to be the least preferred (11 of 11 participants) and the least
satisfying (8 of 11 participants) of the three pay systems (hourly pay, individual
incentive pay, and group incentive pay).
It is important to note that participant’s satisfaction ratings are likely
influenced by the amount of money earned. Dickinson and Gillette (1993) reported
that four of six participants in their study preferred the base pay plus incentive pay
system to the piece rate pay system because they earned more money in this
condition. In other words, the preferences appear to be related to the amount of
money earned rather than to the type of incentive system. Similarly, in a study
designed to identify factors that influence employee reactions to pay for performance
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plans, Miceli, Jung, Near and Greenberger (1991) reported a relationship between the
magnitude of performance-based rewards and satisfaction with the type of pay
system.
High performers will always earn more when they are paid individual
incentives than when they are paid group incentives. Thus, it is not surprising that
high performers report that they prefer individual incentives, given that they can earn
more money under this system than under either hourly pay or group incentive pay
(Honeywell et al.,

1997; Honeywell-Johnson et al.,

2002; McGee,

2004).

Nonetheless, for high performers the amount of pay and the type of incentive system
will always be confounded in actual work settings. Thus, it is likely that high
performers in actual organizations will prefer individual incentives, however, their
preferences may be related to their higher earnings, rather than to the features of the
incentive system.
The Current Study
The current study extended the work of McGee (2004). It examined how
group and individual incentives affected high performance across multiple sessions
using 10-person simulated groups. The primary objectives of the study were to
examine the effects of individual and group monetary incentives on (a) the high
performance of individuals and (b) the satisfaction of high performers. The current
study also extended the work of McGee et al. (2005) by examining whether high
performers would (a) decrease their performance when switched from individual
incentives to group incentives initially (phases BC), and (b) increase their
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performance when reversed from group incentives to individual incentives (phases
CB), using feedback procedures that are more typical of those used in business. That
is, only individual feedback with individual incentives and group feedback with group
incentives. A within-subject reversal design was used. The experimental task was a
computerized data entry task that was modeled after the job of a bank proof operator.
The main difference between the current study and the study conducted by
McGee (2004) related to the feedback procedure utilized during the individual
incentive and group incentive phases. McGee (2004) provided both individual and
group feedback, i.e., social comparison feedback, during the individual incentive and
group incentive phases. In the current study, participants only received individual
feedback with individual incentives and group feedback with group incentives. In
M cGee’s (2004) study, comparative feedback was provided as a control to insure that
decreases that were observed could be attributed to decreased earnings and not to the
participant’s awareness that he/she was a high performer.
Social comparison feedback (SCF) displays specific information about an
individual’s or group’s performance in comparison to a relevant comparison group
(Williams & Geller, 2000). The effects of SCF have not been widely examined
(Alvero, Bucklin, & Austin, 2001; Siero, Bakker, Dekker, & vandenBurg, 1996;
Williams & Geller, 2000). In their 13-year review of feedback literature, Alvero et al.
located only 4 published studies that examined social comparison feedback (Brown &
Sulzer-Azaroff, 1994; Goltz, Citera, Jensen, Favero, & Komaki, 1989; Houmanfar &
Hayes, 1998; Johnson & Masotti, 1990). Moreover, the results from these studies
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were inconclusive. Additionally, Williams & Geller (2000) reported that there is
contradictory evidence regarding the influence of SCF on task performance, and no
published data on the influence of SCF on industrial safety performance. No
published research of SCF in the monetary incentive literature was found.
In three studies (Goltz et al., 1989; Siero et al., 1996; Williams & Geller,
2000) when group feedback was added to individual feedback (or vice versa)
performance increased substantially. Williams and Geller (2000) reported that group
SCF improved safety performance when compared to group feedback alone. Percent
safe scores were substantially higher in the SCF condition (own group performance
compared to other group’s performance) (mean = 78%) versus the group feedback
only condition (mean = 68%). However, the relative applicability of the results from
this study to the present discussion is limited because comparisons were made on the
performance of two different groups and no individual feedback on individual
performance was provided.
Siero et al. (1996) examined the effects of SCF on energy consumption
behavior. Participants were employees of two units of a metallurgical company in
different parts of the Netherlands (distance: 200 miles). The authors examined the
effects of feedback with respect to three types of energy-wasting behaviors, namely
shutting off machines, switching off workstation lights, and a remaining set of energy
consumption behaviors. In one unit, employees received feedback on their own
conservation behavior. In a second unit, employees received feedback on their own
performance and the performance of the first unit, i.e., they received comparative
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feedback. The results clearly showed that employees in the comparative feedback
condition saved more energy than employees who only received information about
their own performance, even six months after the intervention. Employees in the SCF
condition reduced their energy-wasting behavior from 74.1% (pretest) to 22.6%
(second post-test). In contrast, the energy savings of employees who received
feedback only on their own performance returned to baseline levels after a temporal
reduction of energy-wasting behavior. As with the Williams and Geller (2000) study,
Siero et al. (1996) reported comparisons on the performance of two different groups
and did not provide individual feedback on individual performance. One important
finding was that employees in the comparative feedback condition sustained their
energy-saving performance after the end of the study and in the absence of feedback.
In the most directly related study, Goltz et al. (1989) compared the effects of
group feedback with individual plus group feedback. The authors used an ABCB
reversal design to examine the effects of individual and group feedback on product
handling behavior under (A) no feedback, (B) group feedback, and (C) group
feedback plus individual feedback. Participants were 20 day-shift employees from
one department in a microelectronics plant. Results showed that significant
performance improvements (p < 0.001) were obtained when individual feedback was
added to group feedback. However, performance did not decrease significantly (p >
0.05) when individual feedback was removed during the second group feedback
condition. Thus, it cannot be concluded that performance improvements were directly
caused by the addition of individual feedback. As the authors suggest, the increase in
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performance with the introduction of individual feedback may have been due to other
factors that occurred concurrently with the intervention, e.g., history, or to the effect
of learning. Related to this is the possibility that it may be impossible to truly
withdraw individual feedback once it has been introduced. Once an individual is
informed, although individual feedback may no longer be administered, the individual
may be better able to judge whether good or poor performance can be attributed to his
or her own behavior.
As stated previously, the inclusion of comparative group feedback in the
McGee (2004) study eliminated a confound in previous studies (see The effects o f
group incentives on high performance). Recall that participants received individual
and group feedback with both individual and group incentives during the final phases
(CDC) of the study. The inclusion of comparative feedback was provided as a control
to insure that decreases that were observed could be attributed to decreased earnings
and not to the participant’s awareness that he/she was a high performer. Results from
McGee et al. (2005) revealed that high performers performed lower when paid group
incentives with individual and group feedback (D) than when paid individual
incentives with individual and group feedback (C) although the decreases were not
significant (p > 0.05). Performance did increase significantly (p < 0.01) when
participants were switched from the group incentive phase (D) to the final individual
incentive phase (C). The reduction in performance was likely due to decreases in the
amount of money earned rather than to the comparative feedback because (a)
participants who were paid individual incentives did not decrease their performance
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when switched from individual feedback to comparative feedback, i.e., individual and
group feedback (phases BC) (p > 0.05), and (b) participants received comparative
feedback when they received both individual and group incentives during the final
phases (CDC). Thus, any decreases in performance were likely due to decreases in
earnings rather than to the comparative feedback.
W e could find no evidence in the business and industry literature to suggest
that social comparison feedback is commonly provided when group incentives are
also provided. Thus, as is common practice in business and industry, participants in
the present study received individual performance feedback along with the individual
monetary incentives and group feedback along with the group monetary incentives, in
other words, comparative feedback was not provided.
During the group incentive phase, the groups were “simulated.” That is, the
performance of the other members of the group was contrived. Simulated groups have
been used in a number of experiments that have examined the effects of group
membership on individual performance (e.g., Harcum & Badura, 1990; Kerr &
Bruun, 1983; Szymanski & Harkins, 1987; White, Kjelgaard, & Harkins, 1995) and
the results have been consistent with investigations that have used actual groups (e.g.,
Brickner, Harkins, & Ostrom, 1986; Harkins & Szymanski, 1989; London & Oldham,
1977; W eldon & Gargano, 1988; Williams, Harkins, & Latane, 1981). More
relevantly, both Honeywell et al. (2002) and McGee (2004) successfully used
simulated groups when examining the relative effects of hourly pay, individual
incentives and group incentives on high performance. There are two main advantages
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of using simulated rather than actual groups. First, the extent to which a participant’s
performance differs from the group’s performance can be controlled. Second,
idiosyncratic social contingencies within the groups cannot differentially affect the
performance of participants.
To reiterate, the primary objectives of the present study were to examine the
effects of individual and group monetary incentives on the performance and
satisfaction of high performers. The current study also examined whether high
performers would (a) decrease their performance when switched from individual
incentives to group incentives initially, and (b) increase their performance when
reversed from group incentives to individual incentives. As noted above, although the
feedback procedures used in the study (individual feedback with individual incentives
and group feedback with group incentives) do not eliminate the potential confound
that performance may decrease due to information that performers are high
performers, the feedback procedures more accurately replicate those used in actual
business settings than the feedback procedures used in McGee (2004).
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Method
Participants
Participants were 11 college students recruited from junior and senior level
psychology classes at Western Michigan University (see Appendix A for the
recruitment script). They were screened according to three criteria. First, only
keyboard proficient participants, i.e., those who correctly processed at least 750
checks per 45 minutes, were included. This criterion was based on the performance of
high performers who participated in M cGee’s study (2004). The criterion was
required because the purpose of the study was to examine the effects of individual
and group monetary incentives on high performance. Second, only participants who
self-reported that they played computer games for at least one hour each week were
included (see Appendix B for the screening questionnaire). Computer games were
provided to simulate the availability of competing off-task activities in the work
place. If the computer games were not attractive to students, they would not serve the
intended function of being attractive off-task activities. Third, only participants who
scored 100% on a quiz testing their understanding of the pay systems to be used in the
study were included (see Appendix C for the pay systems quiz). The quiz was
administered after the experimenter explained the different pay systems to the
participant. Participants were asked to sign the consent form (see Appendix D) before
they were screened for inclusion in the study. Only participants who signed the
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informed consent form approved by Western Michigan University’s Human Subjects
Institutional Review (HSIRB) were included in the study.
Setting
Sessions were conducted in three on-campus laboratories in 2510, 2512 and
2514 W ood Hall. Each laboratory contained one Dell computer. The three computers
were networked through a Local Area Network (LAN). The computer network
increased the likelihood that participants would believe that their performance was
being combined with the performance of other individuals during, the group incentive
condition. Each computer workstation included an adjustable chair, Dell computer,
color monitor, keyboard, mouse, and gel palm rest.
Experimental Task and Alternative Activities
Participants performed a computerized data entry task that was modeled after
the job of a proof operator in a bank. Simulated bank checks, ranging in value from
$10.00 to $999.99, were presented on the computer screen (see Appendix E).
Participants entered a cash value in a box at the bottom right comer of the computer
screen, using the computer’s numeric keypad. After the participant entered the cash
value and after he/she pressed the enter key to complete the transaction, the next
check was presented.
Participants also had access to seven computer games (FreeCell, Hearts,
Minesweeper, Pinball, Solitaire, Spider Solitaire, and Tetris) and were able to play
them at any time. In order to access the computer games, participants had to minimize
(but not close) the experimental task program. An alternative task was necessary
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because without it participants may have spent all of their time performing the check
task because they had nothing else to do. This could have eliminated any performance
differences under the pay systems due to differences in the time spent off-task.
Dependent Variables
The primary dependent variables were (a) the total number of checks correctly
completed per session, (b) the percentage correct per session, (c) the time spent
performing the experimental task, and (d) the rate of correct check completion. The
percentage correct measure (number of checks correctly completed divided by total
number of checks completed multiplied by 100) was used to determine whether
performance changes were due to changes in accuracy and whether the pay systems
differentially affected quality. Rate was calculated by dividing the number of checks
completed correctly by time on task (in minutes).
The computer program automatically recorded the total number of checks
completed, the number of checks completed correctly and incorrectly, and time (in
seconds) spent off-task. The computer program began to record time (in seconds) as
off-task when the participant had not entered a value in the check program for 10
seconds, and continued recording the time as off-task until the participant entered a
value in the check program.
All data were saved electronically in the participant’s unique computer file, to
a back-up diskette, and were recorded by hand on a data sheet after each experimental
session (see Appendix F). These precautionary steps were taken to insure that data
were not lost due to a computer malfunction.
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Three secondary dependent variables measured participant satisfaction. At the
end of the study, participants were asked to rank order the three pay systems (hourly
pay, individual incentive pay, and group incentive pay) in terms of preference, how
stressful they were, and how satisfied they were with each. The questionnaire is
provided in Appendix G.
Experimental Design
A within-subject reversal design was used. Each participant was exposed to
the pay and feedback conditions in an ABCB sequence, where A = hourly pay with
individual feedback, B = individual incentives with individual feedback, and C =
group incentives with group feedback. The performance of each participant was
compared to his/her own performance during different phases.
Participants were paid hourly during the first phase of the study in order to
demonstrate that the monetary incentives improved performance. W ithout such a
demonstration, it would not be possible to validly compare the effects of the two
different incentive pay systems. Even though this control has been demonstrated
previously in a pilot study and a previous study (McGee, 2004), that is, performance
increased when participants were switched from hourly pay to incentive pay, the
inclusion of this phase increased the internal validity of this study.
In the present study, participants received individual feedback with individual
incentives and group feedback with group incentives. This configuration of feedback
did not include social comparison feedback, and thus performance changes during the
group incentive condition may have occurred because of the decreased pay or the
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comparative feedback indicating that the performance of the participant was higher
than the group’s performance. That is, any changes that occurred cannot be attributed
solely to the decreased pay resulting from the group incentives. In work settings,
however, employees do not typically receive group feedback with individual
incentives, or individual feedback with group incentives. Thus, it was hoped that the
arrangement of incentives and feedback would increase the ecological validity of the
present study.
During the group incentive phase (C), participants were told that their pay was
based on the average'performance of a 10-person group to which they were assigned.
However, the group was “simulated.” That is, there was not a “real” group; rather, the
performance of the other nine members was contrived so that the performance of the
participant was approximately 25% higher than the average performance of the group.
The specific method for calculating the contrived group performance is described in
the Independent Variable section. Although only “high performers” were selected as
participants, this procedure insured that the performance of each participant differed
from the group by the same extent (which could influence the performance of
participants).
Experimental sessions were 45 minutes in duration. Each participant attended
at least five sessions per phase. If performance was not stable after five sessions, that
is, if the num ber o f checks correctly processed is not within + or - 10% o f the first of

three consecutive sessions, the phase was extended until performance was stable or
until the participant had completed 10 sessions (for economic reasons, phases could
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not be extended beyond 10 sessions). Each participant attended from three to five
sessions per week, depending upon his/her availability.
Independent Variable
Participants worked alone in all phases of the study, but in the group pay
condition they were told that their pay was based on the average performance of a 10person work group.
Hourly Pay with Individual Feedback (A)
During the hourly pay phase, participants were paid $5.75 for each 45-minute
session if they correctly completed at least 300 checks. This minimum was based on
the performance of pilot participants, and was approximately two standard deviations
below their average performance on the same task when they were paid hourly. The
inclusion of a minimum performance criterion decreased the likelihood that
participants would not perform the task at all. In work settings, employees must
perform at minimum levels to avoid supervisory criticism and being fired. This
minimum requirement was designed to simulate that contingency.
Immediately before each session participants were given a receipt that
indicated the total number of checks they completed correctly and the amount of
money they earned in their previous session (Appendix H). Receipts were given to
participants before they began their session rather than immediately after each session
because if participants received the group feedback immediately after the sessions
during the simulated group condition, it would have decreased the likelihood that they
would believe that their performance was being combined with that of nine other

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

individuals. In order to control for potential confounds due to the timing of the
feedback, the same feedback procedure was used in all pay conditions. As indicated
in the Experimental Design section, this phase lasted from 5 to 10 sessions,
depending upon when the performance of the participant stabilized.
Participants were paid in cash before their first session of the week or
immediately before the first session of the next pay phase. The feedback script that
was used in this and all subsequent conditions is provided in Appendix I.
Individual Incentive Pay with Individual Feedback (B)
During the individual incentive condition, participants earned $.006 per check
processed correctly. They earned $5.75, an amount equal to the hourly pay, if they
correctly processed 960 checks per session. This equivalency was based on the
average performance of participants in McGee (2004) who were paid incentives.
Participants who processed more than 960 checks earned more money because of the
incentive pay.
Before each session, participants were given a receipt that indicated the total
number of correctly processed checks and the amount of money they earned during
the previous session (Appendix J). They were paid in cash before their first session of
the week or immediately before the first session of the next phase. As with the other
phases, this phase lasted from 5 to 10 sessions, depending upon when the
performance of the participant stabilized.
Group Incentive Pay with Group Feedback (C)
During the group incentive condition, the participant’s pay was based on the
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average performance of the simulated group. Similar to the individual incentive
condition, participants received $.006 per correctly processed check in the group
average. Thus, participants earned $5.75 per session if the group average was 960
checks. The group’s average performance was calculated so that it was about 25%
(range 23%-27%, randomly determined in advance) lower than the average
performance of the participant during the last three sessions of the individual
monetary incentive phase, i.e., after performance was stable. The formula was:
[(about .75 X mean performance for last three sessions X 9) + participant’s current
session performance]/10. Ensuring that the group’s average was 25% lower than the
participant’s controlled the extent to which an individual’s performance differed from
the group’s, which may affect performance under the group incentives.
Before each session, participants were given a receipt that indicated the
average number of checks completed correctly by the simulated group, and the
amount of money they earned for that session based on the group average (Appendix
K). They were paid in cash before their first session of the week or immediately
before the first session of the next phase. As with the preceding phases, this phase
lasted from 5 to 10 sessions until the participant’s performance stabilized.
Independent Variable Integrity
To insure that the computer program was accurately recording, the data, the
experimenter tested it before the start of the first session each week. To insure correct
payment and to reduce the possibility of computational errors, a pay chart (see
Appendix L) was used. During the individual incentive pay condition, the
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experimenter compared the participants’ number of correctly processed checks,
recorded by the computer program, to the pay chart to determine the amount of pay to
be provided based on their individual performance. During the group incentive pay
condition, the experimenter calculated the simulated group’s average performance by
entering the participants’ number of correctly processed checks, recorded by the
computer program, into the mathematical formula described in the Group Incentive
Pay with Group Feedback condition. The resulting value was compared to the pay
chart to determine the amount of pay to be provided to the participant based on the
simulated group’s average performance. A second experimenter verified the
calculation and pay for 30% of the experimental sessions. Interobserver agreement
was calculated by dividing the number of agreements by the number of agreements
plus disagreements, then multiplying by 100. It equaled 99%.
In order to insure that the pay systems and feedback were administered
correctly, the experimenter read from prepared scripts (see Appendix I). Before the
start of each session, the experimenter read a scripted description of the pay system in
effect. In addition, the experimenter read from a script when providing participants
with feedback regarding their performance from the preceding session.
Experimental Procedure
Participants worked alone, out of view from and proximity to other
participants. Participants were asked to refrain from using their cell phones during
each session. This was done to reduce the likelihood that participants would engage in
alternative concurrent activities (e.g., talking with others either in person, or by cell
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phone) while performing the experimental task. The intended off-task activity,
playing computer games, could not be done concurrently with performing the
experimental task.
Introductory Session
Potential participants were paid $5.75 for attending an introductory session.
During the session, the three pay systems, the pay procedures and time requirements
were explained, and conseftt was sought. If consent was obtained, potential
participants were screened using the criteria described in the Participants section.
Potential participants who did not wish to continue their participation or who did not
meet the criteria were paid $5.75 and dismissed. Those who did meet the inclusion
criteria were invited to participate in the study and experimental sessions were
scheduled. Participants scheduled at least three sessions per week. They were also
paid $5.75 immediately following the introductory session.
Experimental Sessions
Before the start of the first session of the study, the experimenter reviewed the
different pay systems with the participants. The experimenter also demonstrated how
to enter values into the computer program, how to minimize and maximize the
computer program, and how to access the computer games.
Participants were paid before their first session of the week or immediately
before the first session of a new pay phase. Before the first session of each pay
condition, the experimenter described the pay system that was in effect and the
associated payment procedure. Before each session within a pay phase, the
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experimenter reminded participants of the pay system in effect for that session.
Before the start of all sessions, except their first, participants were given a session
receipt that indicated their performance from the previous session as described in the
Independent Variable section. In addition, the experimenter reminded participants
that talking on their cell phones was prohibited during the session, that computer
games were available on the computer, and that they were free to take breaks
whenever desired. The experimental session began when the first check appeared on
the computer screen.
In order to control for reactivity to the experimenter, the experimenter was not
present in the computer laboratory during sessions. If the experimenter was present,
participants may have been less likely to engage in off-task activities (Matthews &
Dickinson, 2000). After 45 minutes, the experimenter re-entered the room, ended the
session, thanked the participants for their time, and reminded them of their next
session date and time.
Debriefing Session
Upon completion of their last experimental session, participants were asked
to schedule a debriefing session. The debriefing sessions were held in Room 2532,
Wood Hall. Participants were asked to complete the Satisfaction and Stress Level
Questionnaire (Appendix G). After participants completed the questionnaire, the
experimenter explained the purpose of the study by reading the debriefing script
(Appendix M) and answered participants’ questions.
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HSIRB Approval
Protocol clearance from the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board was
obtained for this project (Appendix N).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

52

Results
Data will be presented first in terms of average performance per phase for
each participant for each dependent variable to provide an overall summary of the
results. Then, session by session data will be presented for each participant comparing
across all dependent variables.
Overall Task Performance
Total Number o f Checks Completed Correctly
Table 1 displays the average number of checks completed correctly per phase
by each participant.
Participant performance on the computer task varied under the different pay
phases. Nine of the eleven participants (P70, P72, P74, P76, P77, P78, P80, P83, and
P84) performed higher during the first individual incentive phase (B) than during the
hourly pay phase (A). Thus, for these participants the monetary incentives controlled
performance permitting a valid comparison between the individual incentive phases
and group incentive phase. The remaining 2 participants (P75 and P82) performed
lower during the first individual incentive phase (B) than during the hourly pay phase
(A). Thus, the monetary incentives did not control their performance effectively.
Furthermore, their performance decreased across all phases of the study.
Of the nine participants whose performance was controlled by the individual
incentives, seven performed higher during both individual incentive phases than
during the group incentive phase. Participant 70’s performance increased across all
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Table 1
Average Number of Checks Completed Correctly by Each Participant
p#

A

B

C

B

70

670 (209.62)

1120(19.24)

1125 (64.28)

1185 (17.12)

72

858 (73.64)

1182 (50.38)

1063 (164.01)

1216 (48.50)

74

621 (27.37)

679 (109.09)

458 (75.98)

527 (88.05)

75

656 (77.31)

514(164.66)

320 (99.67)

237 (31.93)

76

718(220.02)

1116(137.01)

981 (141.04)

1259 (19.54)

77

651 (154.48)

1003 (35.60)

877 (200.24)

1001 (55.56)

78

825 (190.39)

1054 (33.71)

716(443.55)

80

700 (76.46)

945 (37.73)

920(163.71)

82

480 (50.85)

477 (130.31)

355 (126.21)

83

910(73.01)

1289 (74.05)

1219 (50.37)

1338 (29.90)

84

661 (110.54)

778 (84.67)

663 (63.63)

739 (58.95)

AVG

705 (120.91)

923 (273.48)

791 (312.04)

836 (428.44)

293 (110.88)
1100 (30.65)
304(105.16)

Note: A = Hourly Pay; B = Individual Incentive Pay; C = Group Incentive Pay.
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
phases of the study whereas, P78 performed substantially lower during the final
individual incentive phase than during all previous phases.
Accuracy
Table 2 displays average accuracy (calculated as percent correct) per phase for
each participant. Accuracy of all participants was high and stable across all phases.
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Table 2
Average Accuracy (Percent Correct) for Each Participant
p#

A

B

C

B

70

98.02(1.20)

98.42 (0.26)

98.72 (0.36)

98.04 (0.34)

72

96.67 (0.75)

95.56 (1.62)

95.04 (0.98)

95.97 (0.64)

74

99.32 (0.43)

99.11 (0.36)

98.50 (0.89)

98.62 (0.54)

75

99.36 (0.37)

99.16(0.47)

99.36 (0.51)

99.32 (0.42)

76

98.47 (0.52)

97.84 (0.35)

98.75 (0.46)

99.00 (0.55)

77

98.65 (0.45)

98.44(0.11)

98.40 (0.47)

97.84 (0.51)

78

95.32 (1.03)

94.76(1.18)

94.33 (1.37)

94.12(2.39)

80

98.70 (0.42)

99.00 (0.20)

99.03 (0.44)

98.98 (0.44)

82

94.12(2.67)

98.28 (0.96)

97.39(1.22)

96.58 (1.91)

83

98.31 (0.72)

97.62 (0.59)

98.57 (0.86)

97.96 (0.37)

84

98.46 (0.43)

99.03 (0.38)

98.93 (0.43)

98.99 (0.23)

AVG

97.76(1.69)

97.93 (1.47)

97.91 (1.68)

97.77 (1.60)

Note: A = Hourly Pay; B = Individual Incentive Pay; C = Group Incentive Pay.
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
During the monetary incentive phases of the study, accuracy did not decrease
as the number of checks completed correctly increased. This may be due, at least in
part, to the fact that a quality control measure was included in the study; each
participant’s earnings were based on the number of checks completed correctly and
not the total number of checks completed regardless of accuracy. In summary,
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changes in performance were not associated with changes in accuracy, and the
monetary incentive systems did not differentially affect quality.
Time on Task
Table 3 displays the average time (min) on task per phase for each participant.
Table 3
Average Time on Task for Each Participant
p#

A

B

C

B

70

29.27 (9.22)

44.77 (0.43)

44.59 (0.50)

45.00 (0.00)

72

36.02(1.86)

44.24 (0.84)

37.67 (5.42)

43.48(1.06)

74

39.86 (2.98)

35.56 (5.75)

26.17 (6.32)

25.67 (7.99)

75

34.26 (3.85)

25.14 (6.06)

15.71 (3.81)

15.39 (7.73)

76

26.84 (6.24)

38.80 (4.40)

31.66 (5.04)

42.00(1.36)

77

31.96 (8.36)

43.28 (3.10)

38.11 (8.32)

42.50 (2.37)

78

36.93 (9.05)

44.56 (0.36)

29.22(17.16)

11.66 (4.35)

80

38.15 (4.54)

44.17 (0.38)

40.02 (6.80)

44.35 (0.27)

82

33.03 (2.04)

27.47 (6.44)

21.69 (9.07)

19.71 (6.60)

83

33.73 (2.86)

44.86 (0.31)

44.41 (0.14)

44.64 (0.22)

84

35.10(5.96)

35.62 (2.44)

29.66 (3.28)

31.67 (2.82)

AVG

33.20 (3.46)

38.95 (7.21)

32.63 (9.28)

33.28 (12.99)

Note: A = Hourly Pay; B = Individual Incentive Pay; C = Group Incentive Pay.
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Seven participants (P70, P72, P76, P77, P78, P80, and P83) increased the
average time spent on task during the first individual incentive phase (B) when
switched from the hourly pay phase (A). This is generally consistent with overall
changes in task performance (see Table 1). The most dramatic increase in time on
task was observed in P70 whose average time on task during the first individual
incentive phase (B) increased by 15.5 minutes over the hourly pay phase (A). Three
participants (P74, P75, and P82) spent less time on task during the first individual
incentive phase (B) than during the hourly incentive phase (A). The remaining
participant’s (P84) average time on task did not change when switched from the
hourly pay phase (35.10 minutes) to the first individual incentive phase (35.62
minutes).
The average time on task for all but two participants (P70 and P83) decreased
when they were switched from the first individual incentive phase (B) to the group
incentive phase (C). Five participants (P72, P76, P77, P80, and P84) spent more time
on task during the final individual incentive phase (B) than during the group incentive
phase. The average time on task for P70 and P83 was relatively equal during the final
three phases (B-C-B) of the study. A decreasing trend in the amount of time spent on
task across all phases of the study was observed for 3 participants, P74, P75 and P82.
After an initial increase in time spent on task during the first individual incentive
phase, P78 decreased the time spent on task during the final two phases (C-B).
Rate o f Performance
Table 4 displays the average rate of check completion per phase for each
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participant. Rate was calculated by dividing the number of checks completed
correctly by time on task (in minutes).
Table 4
Average Rate of Check Completion for Each Participant
p#

A

B

C

B

70

22.93 (0.53)

25.03 (0.23)

25.32(1.44)

26.33 (0.38)

72

23.82(1.74)

26.71 (0.85)

27.27 (1.62)

27.95 (0.90)

74

16.41 (1.23)

18.87 (0.61)

18.39 (4.41)

20.08 (1.76)

75

19.23 (1.96)

20.15 (1.58)

20.13 (1.37)

18.72 (2.18)

76

26.85 (5.23)

28.75 (0.62)

31.04(1.46)

30.00 (0.94)

77

20.60(1.49)

23.28 (2.05)

22.94 (0.61)

23.66 (0.54)

78

22.44(1.01)

23.63 (0.68)

22.81 (4.33)

25.12(0.75)

80

18.41 (1.41)

21.38 (0.74)

22.99(1.18)

24.77 (0.60)

82

14.47(1.61)

17.28 (1.99)

17.06 (2.79)

15.54 (2.45)

. 83

27.01 (0.79)

28.74(1.51)

27.45 (1.13)

29.96 (0.66)

84

18.87 (1.59)

21.78(1.02)

22.31 (0.65)

23.52 (0.74)

AVG

21.00 (4.03)

23.24 (3.82)

23.52 (4.07)

24.15 (4.58)

Note: A = Hourly Pay; B = Individual Incentive Pay; C = Group Incentive Pay.
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
All participants performed at higher rates during the first individual incentive
phase (B) than during the hourly pay phase (A). Five participants (P74, P77, P78,
P82, and P83) performed at lower rates during the group incentive phase (C) than
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during the first individual incentive phase (B). Additionally, all but three participants
(P75, P76 and P82) performed at higher rates during the second individual incentive
phase (B) than during the group incentive phase (C). Five participants (P70, P72, P76,
P80, and P84) performed at higher rates during the group incentive phase (C) than
during the first individual incentive phase (B). The remaining participant (P75)
performed at the same rate during the final two phases (C-B).
Individual Comparisons o f Average Task Performance to Rate and Time on Task
To illustrate the relationship between three of the dependent variables, i.e.,
number of checks completed correctly, time on task, and rate of performance, the
average performance for each participant across phases is presented in Figures 1
through 4. These summary data help to highlight whether average changes in task
performance across phases were related to changes in rate, time on task, or both.
Accuracy did not vary across phases and was not included in the comparisons.
The white bars on each graph represent the number of checks completed
correctly and the measurement scale is presented on the primary y-axis displayed on
the left side of the graph (range 0 - 1400). The open circles (o) represent time on task
in minutes, the closed circles (• ) represent rate of performance (checks completed per
minute), and the measurement scale for both is presented on the secondary y-axis
displayed on the right side of the graph (range 0 - 45).
For all but three participants (P74, P82, and P83), overall changes in
performance across phases appeared to be due to time spent on task, rather than rate
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Figure 1. Average performance across phases for P70, P72, and P74.
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Figure 2. Average performance across phases for P75, P76, and P77.
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Figure 4. Average performance across phases for P83 and P84.
of performance or some combination of the two. The association between checks
completed correctly and time on task is most clearly seen with the data for P72.
Individual Participant Task Performance
Individual participant task performance data by session are presented and
analyzed to determine trends through visual inspection. Four graphs are presented for
each participant to illustrate performance by session as follows: (1) checks completed
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correctly, (2) rate of check completion, (3) time on task, and (4) percent correct.
Participants with similar data trends on task performance are grouped together.
Performance was considered to have increased or decreased during a phase
based on visual inspection, and across phases if the average performance, i.e., number
of checks completed correctly, changed by at least fifty checks.
Participants Whose Performance Decreased During the Group Incentive Phase and
Increased During the Final Individual Incentive Phase
Participants 72, 74, 76, 77, 83, and 84 exhibited similar trends in performance,
i.e., the number of checks completed correctly, across all phases (Figures 5 - 1 0 ) .
Their performance increased when switched from the hourly pay phase (A) to the first
individual incentive phase (B), decreased when switched to the group incentive phase
(C), and increased when reversed to the final individual incentive phase (B). For
participants 72, 76, 77, and 84, overall changes in number of checks completed
appeared to correspond with changes in time on task, rather than rate of performance.
Participant 72. Figure 5 displays performance data by session for P72. During
the hourly pay phase, when the minimum check criterion was in effect, the number of
checks completed correctly decreased gradually. Changes in performance during this
phase appear to be due to changes in rate of performance, rather than to time on task.
In other words, increases in performance were marked by increases in rate of
performance and decreases marked by decreases in rate of performance.
During the first individual incentive phase (B), performance was substantially
higher than during the hourly pay phase (A). Performance was relatively stable during
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Figure 5. Task performance data by session for P72.
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Figure 6. Task performance data by session for P74.
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Figure 7. Task performance data by session for P76.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1400 “i
1200

-

° 1000 -

Checks

600 -

400
200

-

1011 12 13 14J15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23124 25 26 27 28 29

30
25 20

-

10

-

10111213 14|15 16 17 18 19 2021 22 23'24 25 26 27 28 29

45 1
40 -

30 25 20

-

10111213 14il516171819 202122 231242526 27 28 29

100

1 011121314‘1516171819 20 2122 23'24 25 26 27 28 29
Sessions

Figure 8. Task performance data by session for P77.
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Figure 9. Task performance data by session for P83.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1400 i
1200
o 1000 -

800 600 400 200

-

11 12 13 14 15 16! 17 18 19 20 21|22 23 24 25 26

11 12 13 14 15 16] 17 18 19 20 21 '22 23 24 25 26

45 1
40 35 30 25 20

-

10

-

11 12 13 14 15 16' 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

1 0 0 -1

90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20

*
-

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Sessions

Figure 10. Task performance data by session for P84.
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this phase and changes in the number of checks completed correctly appear to be due
to some combination of changes in both rate of performance and time on task. During
the first two sessions of the group incentive phase (C), the number of checks
completed correctly was comparable to the number completed during the individual
incentive phase (B), then decreased sharply during the third session and remained low
for the final two sessions. The decreases in performance correspond to sharp
decreases in time on task and inversely with increases in rate of performance. When
switched to the final individual incentive phase, P72’s performance increased and
surpassed previous performance under the first individual incentive phase (B). As
with the first individual incentive phase (B) performance changes during the final
phase appear to be due to some combination of changes in both rate of performance
and time on task. Accuracy was high and stable across all phases of the study.
Participant 74, Figure 6 displays performance data by session for P74. P74’s
performance increased initially when switched from the hourly pay phase (A) to the
first individual incentive phase (B) and decreased gradually during this phase. These
performance changes appear to correspond with changes in time on task, rather than
to changes in the rate of performance. P74’s performance decreased further when
switched to the group incentive phase. Performance changes correspond with changes
in time on task for all sessions except the final session when a sharp decrease in rate
of performance corresponded with the low performance. When switched to the final
individual incentive phase (B), performance increased when compared to the group
incentive phase (C) but failed to increase to previous levels when compared to the
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first individual incentive phase (B). Changes in performance during the final phase
appear to be due to changes in time on task, rather than to rate of performance. That
is, changes in performance were marked by similar changes in time on task. During
the last session, a sharp decrease in time on task and a higher rate on performance
combined to result in an overall decrease in number of checks completed correctly.
Accuracy of check completion was high and stable across all phases of the study.
Participant 76. Figure 7 displays performance data by session for P76. During
the hourly pay phase, when the minimum check criterion was in effect, the number of
checks completed correctly and time on task decreased substantially, except for the
final session. During the final session in the hourly pay phase, time on task increased
and rate of performance decreased resulting in a marked decreased in performance.
The participant’s performance and time on task increased considerably at the start of
the first individual incentive phase (B), and then both measures decreased over the
next three sessions before rebounding during the final four sessions. During the group
incentive phase (C), changes in overall task performance correspond fairly well with
changes in the amount of time spent on task. Thus, during the first three phases (A-BC), increases in performance were marked by increases in time on task and decreases
marked by decreases in time on task. During the final individual incentive phase (B),
performance surpassed previous levels under the first individual incentive phase (B).
Initially, this increase was accompanied by an increase in time on task and a slight
decrease in rate of performance. As the phase continued, the number of checks
completed remained very stable while time on task decreased slightly and rate
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increased slightly. Rate of performance was high and stable during both individual
incentive phases (B), and was high and comparably more variable during the group
incentive phase (C). Accuracy of check completion was high and stable across all
phases of the study.
Participant 77. Figure 8 displays performance data by session for P77. During
the hourly pay phase, the number of checks completed correctly decreased gradually
except for session five when performance increased markedly. Performance changes
in this phase appear to correspond to changes in time on task, rather than rate of
performance. Rate was relatively stable during the hourly pay phase (A) except for
the final session when it increased sharply compared to the preceding eight sessions.
Participant 77’s performance and time on task increased substantially and were
relatively stable when switched to the first individual incentive phase (B), remained
high and stable during the first four sessions in the group incentive phase (C) before
decreasing, and then, returned to high and stable levels during the final individual
incentive phase (B). During all phases (A-B-C-B), changes in overall task
performance corresponded fairly well with changes in the amount of time spent on
task, rather than rate of performance. Rate of performance was stable across all
sessions with the exception of sessions nine and ten when it increased appreciably.
Accuracy of check completion was high and stable across all phases of the study.
Participant 83. Figure 9 displays performance data by session for P83. During
the hourly pay phase, the number of checks completed correctly decreased initially
and then leveled off during the final sessions of the phase. Performance changes in
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this phase appear to correspond to changes in time on task, rather than rate of
performance. Rate was relatively stable during the hourly pay phase (A). Participant
83’s performance increased substantially when switched to the first individual
incentive phase (B), decreased during the group incentive phase (C), and then,
returned to high and stable levels, surpassing all previous performance during the
final individual incentive phase (B). During the final three phases (B-C-B), time on
task remained at or very near the entire 45 minutes. Thus, any changes in
performance during these phases were necessarily due to changes in the rate of
performance. Accuracy of check completion was high and stable across all phases of
the study.
Participant 84. Figure 10 displays performance data by session for P84. P84’s
performance increased initially when switched from the hourly pay phase (A) to the
first individual incentive phase (B), decreased during the second session and then
increased during the final four sessions in this phase. The participant’s performance
decreased when switched to the group incentive phase (C) and reversed to previously
higher levels during the final individual incentive phase (C). During all phases (A-BC-B), changes in overall task performance corresponded fairly well with changes in
the amount of time spent on task, rather than rate of performance. Rate of
performance was stable across all sessions. Accuracy of check completion was high
and stable across all phases of the study.
Participant Whose Performance Decreased During the Group Incentive Phase but
Failed to Increase During the Final.Individual Incentive Phase
Participant 78’s performance increased when switched from the hourly pay
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phase (A) to the first individual incentive phase (B), decreased during the group
incentive phase (C) and continued to decrease during the final individual incentive
phase (B) (Figure 11). During the hourly pay phase (A), the group incentive phase
(C), and the final individual incentive phase (B), changes in overall task performance
correspond fairly well with changes in the amount of time spent on task, rather than
rate of performance. During the first individual incentive phase (B), changes in rate of
performance appear to account for changes in the number of checks completed
correctly. Accuracy was high and stable across all phases of the study.
Participants Whose Performance D id Not Change During the Group Incentive Phase
and Increased During the Final Individual Incentive P)iase
Participants 70 and 80 exhibited similar trends in performance across all
phases (Figures 12 and 13). Their performance increased when switched from the
hourly pay phase (A) to the first individual incentive phase (B), remained comparable
(less than plus or minus 50 checks) when switched to the group incentive phase (C),
and increased when reversed to the final individual incentive phase (B). For P70,
changes in performance across phases appear to correspond with changes on rate of
performance. For P80, performance changes correspond to both changes in time on
task and rate of performance.
Participant 70. Figure 12 displays performance data by session for P70. The
number of checks completed correctly and time on task decreased dramatically during
the hourly pay phase. The participant’s performance and time on task increased
substantially and were relatively stable when switched to the first individual incentive
phase (B), remained high and stable during the group incentive phase (C), and
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Figure 11. Task performance data by session for P78.
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Figure 12. Task performance data by session for P70.
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Figure 13. Task performance data by session for P80.
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continued to be high and stable during the final individual incentive phase (B). Rate
of performance increased slightly during the hourly phase (A) and corresponded with
the number of checks completed correctly during the next three phases (B-C-B).
Furthermore, time on task remained at or very near the entire 45 minutes during the
final three phases (B-C-B). Thus, any changes in performance during these phases
were necessarily due to changes in the rate of performance. There was a slight
I

decrease in rate of performance during session 18 and this is reflected in fewer checks
completed correctly for that session. Accuracy was high and stable across all phases.
Participant 80. Participant 80’s performance increased when switched from
the hourly pay phase (A) to the first individual incentive phase (B), remained
comparable during the most of the group incentive phase (C) before decreasing
sharply at the end of the phase, and then surpassed previous levels during the final
individual incentive phase (B) (Figure 13). Performance changes during the hourly
pay phase (A) and the group incentive pay phase (C) correspond with changes to time
on task. In contrast, performance changes during the individual incentive phases (B)
correspond with changes in rate of performance. Accuracy was high and stable across
all phases of the study.
Participants 'Whose Performance Decreased Across All Phases
Participants 75 and 82 displayed similar trends in performance across phases
(Figures 14 and 15). Performance decreased when switched to the first individual
incentive phase indicating that the incentives did not control their performance. Even
so, they were kept in the study to examine what effects, if any, would result from the
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Figure 14, Task performance data by session for P75.
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Figure 15. Task performance data by session for P82.
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interventions. The number of checks completed correctly by P75 and P82 continued
to decrease across the final two phases (C-B). Visual analysis of the session by
session data suggest that performance changes correspond with changes in time on
task rather than rate of performance. Accuracy of check completion was high and
stable across all phases.
Amount o f Money Earned
Table 5 displays the average amount of money earned per session for each
participant. Six participants (P70, P72, P76, P77, P78, and P83) earned, on average,
more during the first individual incentive phase than they had during the hourly pay.
phase. All participants earned less during the group incentive phase than they had
during the first individual incentive phase. Notably, P83 earned, on average, $1.25
less during the group incentive than during first individual incentive phase but this
was, on average, $0.25 more than she earned during the hourly pay phase. All but
three participants (P75, P78, and P82) earned, on average, more during the final
incentive phase than during the group incentive phase. The performance of P78
decreased sharply over the final phase of the study, whereas the performance of P75
and P82 decreased across all phases of the study.
As stated previously, all participants earned less during the group incentive
phase than they had during the first individual incentive phase. For all but two
participants (P70 and P80), decreased earnings were associated with decreased
performance during the group incentive phase. O f the remaining nine participants, six
increased their performance when switched to the final individual incentive phase.
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82
Table 5
Average Amount of Money Earned by Each Participant
p#

A

B

C

B

70

$5.75

$6.70

$5.20

$7.10

72

$5.75

$7.10

$5.40

$7.30

74

$5.75

$4.05

$2.80

$3.15

75

$5.75

$3.10

$2.00

$1.40

76

$5.75

$6.70

$5.55

$7.55

77

$5.75

$6.00

$4.55

$6.00

78

$5.75

$6.30

$4.90

$1.70

80

$5.75

$5.65

$4.40

$6.60

82

$5.75

$2.85

$2.05

$1.80

83

$5.75

$7.75

$6.00

$8.05

84

$5.75

$4.65

$3.40

$4.45

Note: A = Hourly Pay; B = Individual Incentive Pay; C = Group Incentive Pay.
Preference, Satisfaction, and Stress
All participants attended a debriefing session following their final session.
Participants completed a preference, satisfaction, and stress questionnaire (Appendix
G) where they were asked to rank order the three pay systems as either most, second
or least, in terms of preference, satisfaction, and stress level (Table 6). After
participants completed the questionnaire, the experimenter explained the purpose of
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the study, reviewed participants’ data with them, and answered their questions
regarding the study.
Table 6
Preference, Satisfaction, and Stress Level Ranks
Preference
Pay
Hrly
Pay
Ind
Inc
Grp
Inc

Satisfaction

Stress

Most

Second

Least

Most

Second

Least

Most

Second

Least

5

3

3

5

6

0

0

2

8

6

4

1

6

3

2

3

5

2

0

4

7

0

2

9

7

3

0

Note: One participant commented that there was no difference in stress level between
the three pay systems and thus, did not rank order them.
In terms of preference, 6 of 11 participants ranked the individual incentive
systems as most preferred and 5 ranked the hourly pay system as the most preferred.
Seven of the 11 least preferred the group incentive system.
When asked to explain their preference, those who most preferred the
individual incentive system indicated that they had more control over their success
and the amount they were paid. Those who most preferred the hourly pay system
noted that this pay condition required the least amount of effort. In fact, one
participant stated, “during the hourly pay period you could do less and earn more,”
and another commented that “the amount of necessary work nearly tripled to reach
the initial rate established in the hourly scale.” Thus, it appears that for some
participants the response effort associated with the task was more salient to them than
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the amount of money they could have earned under the individual incentive pay
system.
In terms of satisfaction, six participants (P70, P72, P76, P77, P83, and P84)
ranked the individual incentive system as most satisfying, whereas the remaining five
ranked the hourly pay system as most satisfying. Nine participants ranked the group
incentive system the least satisfying. Participants who indicated that the hourly pay
system was most satisfying provided the following reasons for doing so: “it required
the least amount of work and had a greater payoff;” “it was the easiest of the 3, by
exceeding expectations in the hourly setting there is a sense of performing better for
the company;” and “all I had to do was a certain amount of checks and then I could
play games or whatever until the time was up.” Participants who ranked the
individual incentive system as most satisfying provided the following explanations
for their rankings: “I got rewarded highly for my performance, and made the most
money.”
In terms of stress level, the majority of participants (8 of 11) found the hourly
pay system to be the least stressful, whereas 7 of 11 participants found the group
incentive system to be most stressful. Three participants ranked the individual
incentive system as most stressful. One participant (P75) noted that there was no
difference between the 3 pay systems in terms of stress level and did not rank order
them. Participants who ranked the group incentive system as most stressful provided
the following explanations for their rankings: “I didn’t want to be the reason everyone
in my group didn’t get paid as much;” “no matter how well I did, I didn’t get paid as
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much;” “I got angry at the other people in my group because I felt their lack of
performance kept me from making money;” and “I felt like my performance hindered
performance of the group.” Participants who indicated that the individual incentive
system was most stressful provided the following reasons for doing so: “there was no
cushion, and what you did was what you were paid for;” “with hourly I could relax,
and with individual, I could but wouldn’t make as much;” and “individual was most
stressful because I knew my performance determined my pay, group was second
because I couldn’t control as much and hourly last because the expectation was less.”
Participants’ written answers and comments provided during the debriefing
session may account for some of the data trends observed over the course of the
study. For example, when asked why he preferred the hourly pay system versus the
other systems, one participant (P75) responded, “the amount of necessary work nearly
tripled to reach the initial rate established in the hourly scale.” Visual inspection of
his data revealed that there was a substantial increase in performance and time on task
during the first session of the first individual incentive phase (Figure 14) but after this
session, performance decreased over the remaining phases of the study. The answers
and comments highlighted how tangential events can affect performance. For
example, P78 reported that she had received a student loan midway through the study.
Upon closer inspection of her data she confirmed that she received the loan during the
group incentive phase. This corresponded with a marked reduction in performance
that continued through the end of the study (Figure 11).
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Discussion
The current study examined how hourly pay, individual monetary incentives
with individual feedback, and group monetary incentives with group feedback
affected the performance and satisfaction of high performers. The results obtained in
this study extend previous studies that have attempted to determine the relative
effectiveness of individual monetary incentives and group monetary incentives on
performance (Allison et al., 1992; Farr, 1976; Honeywell et al., 1997; HoneywellJohnson et al., 2002; Roberts & Leary, 1990; Smoot, 1997; Stoneman & Dickinson,
1989; Thurkow et al., 2000). Additionally, this study extends the work of McGee
(2004) by examining how different types of feedback influence performance under
individual and group monetary incentive systems. This knowledge may help
businesses better assess the utility and appropriateness of individual and group
incentives thereby enabling them to better design pay systems that satisfy both the
organization and the employee.
An in-depth analysis of the results is presented first in terms of performance,
and then in terms of preference, satisfaction and stress. Following this discussion,
implications for business and industry, and suggestions for future research are made.
Performance
Participants were 11 college students who were regarded as high performers
after successfully exceeding the minimum performance criterion by completing more
than 750 checks correctly during the introductory session. Performance on the
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experimental task during the introductory session ranged from 752 to 1327 checks
completed correctly. In addition, each participant spent the entire 45-minute
introductory session on task. Thus, it’s important to note that while each participant
was keyboard proficient, there were individual differences in levels of skill and
proficiency.
The majority of participants (9 of 11) performed better during the first
individual incentive phase than during the hourly pay phase. Thus, monetary
incentives effectively controlled their performance permitting a valid comparison
between individual and group incentives for these 9 participants. Seven of these 9
participants also performed better when paid individual and group incentives than
when paid hourly.
Two participants (P75 and P82) performed lower during the first individual
incentive phase than during the hourly pay phase indicating that the monetary
incentives did not effectively control their performance, and thus suggesting that they
should not be considered high performers. Even so, they were kept in the study to
examine what effects, if any, would result from the interventions. Their performance
continued to decrease across the final two phases (C-B). Visual analysis of their
session by session data suggest that performance changes correspond with changes in
time on task rather than rate of performance. This suggests that even though these
participants were proficient in the task other factors influenced their day-to-day
performance. Additionally, both participants only narrowly exceeded the proficiency
criterion during the introductory session to be included in the study. When questioned
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during their debriefing sessions, both participants indicated that too much effort or
work was required during the individual incentive phase to earn the same pay as they
had during the hourly pay phase. This suggests that verbal behavior (self-stated rules)
may have been a factor in influencing their performance under various pay systems.
Furthermore, it appears that for these participants the response effort associated with
the task was more salient to them than the amount of money they could have earned
under the individual incentive phases. Additionally, the order of the different pay
system phases may have affected performance.
These results may also be due to the design of the pay systems in the current
study, and thus unique to it. In the current study, the individual incentive system was
designed so that participants would earn the same amount as they earned in the hourly
pay condition if they performed at the average level of individuals who were paid
incentives from previous studies. This was done in an attempt to control for the
amount of money earned. However, in most real world incentive systems, employees
begin earning incentives when their performance exceeds average performance under
hourly pay. Thus, the current incentive system did require considerably more effort to
earn incentives than is typical in most business settings. Accordingly, results, at least
for these 2 participants (P75 and P82), may have been different if the design of the
current incentive system had been more similar to those in actual work settings.
Seven of the nine participants whose performance was controlled by the
individual incentives decreased their performance during the group incentive phase.
The average performance of the two remaining participants (P70 and P80) was
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comparable during the first individual incentive phase and the group incentive phase
(i.e., less than plus or minus 50 checks), and increased during the final incentive
phase. However, it’s important to note that P80’s performance decreased markedly
during the final three sessions in the group incentive phase and this resulted in a slight
reduction in her average overall performance (25 checks). Thus, her performance was
affected during the group incentive phase, but it took multiple sessions for
performance to be controlled by the group contingencies. These data (P80’s
performance) suggest that some high performers may need to be exposed to group
incentives multiple times for performance changes (decreases) to emerge.
O f the seven participants whose performance decreased during the group
incentive phase, six increased their performance during the final individual incentive
phase. Only the performance of P78 failed to increase when switched to the final
individual incentive phase. When questioned during the debriefing session, she
reported that she had received a student loan during the group incentive phase and
this corresponded with the striking reduction in performance that continued through
the end of the study.
The results of the current study indicate that high performers may well
perform lower when paid group incentives than when paid individual incentives
which, in turn, may decrease overall group performance and therefore organizational
performance. These results are similar to those found by Honeywell et al. (2002) and
McGee et al. (2005). In the Honeywell et al. (2002) study, which used the same
experimental design and feedback conditions as the current study, the majority of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

participants (3 of 4) performed lower when paid group incentives than when paid
individual incentives. The experimental task utilized in the Honeywell et al. (2002)
study differed considerably from the experimental task in the current study, yet the
results in both were very similar, thus adding credibility to the replication of results.
For a detailed description of the study and results refer to the preceding section, The
effects o f group incentives on high performance.
The results of the current study are also similar to those found by McGee et al.
(2005). Statistical analyses from that study revealed that high performers performed
lower when paid group incentives than when paid individual incentives after exposure
to both pay systems although the decrease in performance was not significant (p >
0.05). However, high performers increased their performance significantly when
switched from the group incentive phase to the final individual incentive phase (p <
0.01). The individual feedback component (which was part of the comparative
feedback procedure in the final three phases) may have initially sustained
performance during the group incentive phase. However, after exposure to both types
of pay systems, performance was significantly higher when participants were
switched to the final individual incentive phase.
The two studies differed operationally in two important ways. First, McGee
(2004) provided both individual and group feedback, i.e., social comparison
feedback, during the individual incentive and group incentive phases. In the current
study, participants only received individual feedback with individual incentives and
group feedback with group incentives. Secondly, it was possible for participants in
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the McGee (2004) study to be on task and off task at the same time. That is, they
could converse with other participants who were working in close proximity to them
or by cell phone and still perform the computer task. To reduce the likelihood that
participants would engage in alternative concurrent activities during the current study,
participants worked alone, out of view from and proximity to other participants, and
were asked to refrain from using their cell phones during each session.
Preference, Satisfaction, and Stress
The majority of participants found the individual incentive pay to be the most
preferred (6 of 11) and most satisfying (6 of 11), and the group incentive pay to be the
least preferred (7 of 11), least satisfying (9 of 11), and most stressful (7 of 10) of the
three pay systems. One participant (P75) commented that there was no difference in
stressfulness between the three pay systems and did not rank them on the
questionnaire. These results are similar to those reported in three studies (Honeywell
et al., 1997; Honeywell-Johnson et al., 2002; McGee, 2004) that examined high
performers, and also reported participants’ satisfaction with and/or preference for the
individual incentive and group incentive systems.
It should be noted that the preference and satisfaction data may reflect the fact
that participants earned more money when they were paid individual incentives than
when they were paid group incentives or hourly wages. Previous studies have
reported that participant preference and satisfaction for different pay systems are
influenced by the amount earned (Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001; Dickinson & Gillette,
1993; Honeywell et al., 1997; Honeywell-Johnson et al., 2002). Nonetheless, as
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pointed out by Honeywell-Johnson et al. (2002), high performers will always earn
more money when they are paid individual incentives than when they are paid group
incentives. Thus, for high performers, the amount of pay and type of pay system will
always be confounded in work settings. It is likely that high performers in actual
organizations will prefer individual incentives, however, their preferences may be
related to their higher earnings, rather than to the features of the incentive system.
Implications fo r Business and Industry
The results of the current study have implications for business and industry.
The results suggest that for high performers, group incentives may decrease
performance when compared to individual incentives, and as a result decrease overall
group performance. In turn, organizational performance may suffer. It should be
noted that the extent to which group performance may suffer not only depends upon
the effects of group incentives on high performance but also on how they affect
average and low performance, both of which have yet to be investigated empirically.
The results also suggest that the introduction and order of pay system
administration may affect performance. Recall that in the current study, two
participants whose performance did not increase when switched to individual
incentives indicated that exposure to the hourly pay system likely affected their
subsequent lower performance. Also, participants in the McGee et al. (2005) study
were affected by exposure. That is, they only significantly increased their
performance under individual incentives after having been exposed to individual and
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group pay systems. Thus, organizations must consider employees’ history and
experience when designing, introducing, and implementing pay systems.
In addition, the majority of high performers found the individual incentive pay
to be the most preferred and satisfying of the three pay systems and the group
incentive pay to be the least preferred, least satisfying and most stressful of the three
pay systems. These data are consistent with those reported in earlier studies
(Honeywell et al., 1997; Honeywell-Johnson et al., 2002; Kuhn & Yockey, 2003).
Although satisfaction with pay and the pay system is only one facet of overall job
satisfaction, if high performers are unhappy with the way they are paid it could
influence their overall job satisfaction and increase turnover (Miceli & Mulvey,

2000).
Suggestions fo r Future Research
The order in which the different pay system phases were implemented and the
design of the individual incentive system may have affected performance. For
example, two participants, when questioned about their failure to increase their
performance when switched from hourly pay to individual incentives, commented
that they would have had to exert substantially more effort than was initially
acceptable to earn the same amount of pay. Thus, future researchers should consider
altering the order of pay system administration and designing the individual incentive
system to be more typical of those implemented in actual business settings that
require less response effort to earn additional money.
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The effects of social contingencies should be investigated. In the current
study, participants were told that they were working as part of a ten-person group that
they had been assigned to but were given no other information about the group
members. When questioned, some participants stated that the implied social,
contingencies affected their performance. For example, some stated that they
continued to perform at high levels because they didn’t want to hinder the group’s
performance, others stated that they performed at lower levels because they had no
control over their pay, and one participant stated that she could “slack off and let the
rest of the group do the work.” In contrast, other participants commented that because
they didn’t know the other members in their group, they didn’t care how their
performance affected them. Future researchers should investigate the effects that
social contingencies have on performance and satisfaction.
Future research should examine the effects of individual and group monetary
incentives on the performance and satisfaction of average and low performers. The
extent to which group performance may suffer not only depends upon the effects of
group incentives on high performance but also on how they affect average and low
performance. For example, if average and low performers increase their performance
when they are paid group incentives, then even if high performers decrease their
performance, overall group performance may not be affected.
Finally, as with all laboratory studies, caution must be exerted when
generalizing the results to actual business settings. Replication of this study in an
actual work setting is recommended.
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Recruitment Script
Hello! My name is Kathryn Culig and I am a doctoral student in psychology at
Western Michigan University. My area of specialization is organizational behavior
management. I am looking for individuals to participate in a study designed to
determine how individuals perform a data entry task when they are paid different
ways. The data entry task simulates the job of a proof operator at a bank and consists
of entering numbers using the numeric keypad on a computer. Computer games will
also be available during the sessions if individuals want to play them. The study will
be conducted in W ood Hall on W M U ’s campus.
Participation will require you to attend a minimum of 20 45-minute sessions and a
maximum of 40 sessions, for a total of at least 15 hours, not to exceed 30 hours of
your time, over a 7 to 14 week period of time. The amount of money you will be paid
will depend upon your performance, but it is likely that you will earn at least $120.00
if you complete the study. You may earn more if your performance on the task is
higher than average and if you are asked to attend more than 20 sessions.
Your participation is completely voluntary. If you choose to participate, you may
leave the study at any time. If you do leave the study early, you will be paid for your
participation up to that point. Your willingness to participate in, or your withdrawal
from the study at any time, will in no way affect your grade in this or any other class.
If you would like to learn more about this study and play computer games at least one
hour a week, please print your name, phone number or email address on a sheet of
paper, whichever is most convenient for you, and give it to me. I am also handing out
a sheet of paper with my name, telephone number and email address, and you can
contact me by telephone or email if you prefer.
I will be contacting you within the next few days to arrange a time that we can meet
to discuss the details of the study.
Thank you for your time!
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Participant Num ber_
Instruction: Please answer the following questions. All information will remain
confidential.

1. Do you play any of the
Freecell
Tetris
Solitaire
Pinball
Minesweeper
Hearts
Spider Solitaire

following computer games?
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No

2. If you play games, how often do you play?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 times a day
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 days a week
1 2 3 4 times a month
3. On average, how many hours per week do you play computer games?
<1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

10+ hours per week

4. Do you know anyone that has signed up to participate in the study? Please list
their names.

5. If you know anyone that might be interested in signing up for the study, please
refer him or her to Kathryn Culig 383-1171.
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Participant Number:_____
Pay Condition Quiz
HOURLY PAY SYSTEM:
Individuals are paid $5.75 for a 45-minute session.
INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVE PAY SYSTEM:
Individuals are paid $.006 for every check correctly processed during the session.
GROUP INCENTIVE PAY SYSTEM:
Individuals are paid $.006 for every check correctly processed during the session,
determined by the group’s average number of correctly processed checks.
Answer the following questions based on the above pay systems.
1. Jane correctly processed 1200 checks during a session. Jane’s group correctly
processed 1000 checks.
A. W hat amount would Jane earn under the GROUP INCENTIVE pay system?
B. W hat amount would Jane earn under the INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVE pay
system?
C. W hat amount would Jane earn under the HOURLY pay system?
2. Ed correctly processed 950 checks during a session. Ed’s group correctly
processed 1200 checks.
A. W hat amount would Ed earn under the GROUP INCENTIVE pay system?
B. W hat amount would Ed earn under the INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVE pay
system?
C. W hat amount would Ed earn under the HOURLY pay system?
3. Mary correctly processed 750 checks during a session. M ary’s group correctly
processed 700 checks.
A. W hat amount would Mary earn under the GROUP INCENTIVE pay system?
B. W hat amount would Mary earn under the INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVE pay
system?
C. W hat amount would Mary earn under the HOURLY pay system?

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Appendix D
Consent Document

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

102

W

ester n

H.

M

ic h ig a n

S.

I.

U

R.

n iv e r s it y

B.

Approved for use for one year from this date:

FEB 2 'a Z0U4

x_M
The Effects o f Different Types o f Pay on Work Performance
Western Michigan University
Department o f Psychology
Principal Investigator: Dr. Alyce M. Dickinson
Student Investigator: Kathryn M. Culig
I have been invited to participate in a research study intended to investigate the effects o f
different types o f pay on work performance. This project is Kathryn Culig’s dissertation
project. Dr. Dickinson is her advisor.
Participation requirements. During today’s introductory session, my eligibility to
participate in this study will be determined. First, I must indicate that I spend a certain
amount o f time using computer games and that I am available to attend scheduled
sessions. Second, the experimenter will explain the ways I will be paid during the study.
After that explanation, I must pass a quiz that tests my understanding o f the ways I will be
paid. Additionally, participants in the study need, to perform at certain levels on the data
entry task. My performance on the data entry task will be assessed during today’s session.
If I perform at a certain level and meet the other eligibility requirements, I will be invited
to participate. If not, I will be paid S5.75 for attending the session, but will not be invited
to participate in the study.
Explanation o f study procedures and length o f participation. I will perform a
computerized data entry task. Simulated bank checks will be displayed on the computer
screen and I will type the amounts o f the checks using the computer keyboard. Each
session will be 45 minutes and I will be asked to attend at least 20 sessions. Thus, my
total time commitment will be at least 15 hours. I may be asked to attend up to 40
sessions, for a total o f 30 hours. I will be asked to schedule at least three sessions per
week, thus I will be involved in the study for 7 to 14 weeks. The total number o f sessions
I will attend will depend upon my performance. I will be able to take a break and engage
in other activities (i.e., computer games) at any time during my scheduled sessions.
Compensation. I will receive monetary compensation for my participation in the study. I
will receive $5.75 immediately following today’s introductory session. During the study, I
will be paid three different ways. In some sessions, I will be paid $5.75 per session as
long as I correctly process a minimum o f 490 checks. In other sessions, the amount of
money I will earn will depend upon how many checks I correctly process. In other
sessions, the total amount o f money 1 earn will depend on the average number o f correctly
processed checks completed by the group to which I am assigned. I will be paid in cash
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once a week. The total amount o f money I will earn will depend upon my performance
and the performance o f my group, but it is likely that I will earn at least SI20.00 if 1
complete the study. I may earn more if my performance on the task is higher than average
and if Dr. Dickinson and Kathryn Culig ask me to attend more than 20 sessions. The
more sessions I attend, the more money I will make.
Benefits. The only benefit I will receive for participating in this study will be the amount
o f money I earn. The data obtained from this study will help determine how different pay
systems affect the performance o f individuals. This knowledge may allow businesses to
design better pay systems.
Risks. The amount o f time it will take to participate in this study may make it
inconvenient. I may experience physical discomfort associated with the data entry task.
This will be offset by the fact that the computer workstations have been set up in
accordance with accepted ergonomic standards provided by the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration. In addition, I may take work breaks whenever I want and will be
prompted by the experimenter to take a break during the session. During the 45-minute
sessions, I may also encounter fatigue or mild stress while performing the task. This will
be offset by the fact that I can take breaks and/or engage in alternative activities whenever
I want. Because o f past experience with the type o f task that will be used in this study,
individuals perform differently on it. My performance may be different than the
performance o f others and this may be stressful to me as well.
Confidentiality. All information obtained in this study will remain strictly confidential.
When results o f the study are presented publicly, I will not be identified. I will be
assigned a number and that number will be used to identify my data. By signing this
consent document I am giving permission for data obtained in this study to be presented
in professional presentations and publications.
Voluntary participation. My participation in this study is entirely voluntary. I may
withdraw from the study at any time without penalty. If I do withdraw, I will receive the
amount o f money that I have earned up to that point. My participation in the study, or my
withdrawal from the study, will not affect my grades in any o f my courses. At the end of
the study, the experimenter will answer any questions I have and explain how my data
will help to leam more about pay systems.
Who to contact with questions. If I have any questions7concerning this study 1 may call
Kathryn Culig at (269) 383-1171. In addition, Dr. Dickinson, the faculty advisor for the
study, can be reached at 387-4473. I may also contact the Chair, Human Subjects
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Institutional Review Board (387-8293), or the Vice President for Research, at 387-8298,
if questions or problems arise during the course o f the study.
This consent document has been approved for use for one year by the Human Subjects
Institutional Review Board as indicated by the stamped date and signature o f the board
chair in the upper right comer. Participants should not sign this document if the comer
does not have a stamped date and signature.
M y sig n a tu re b elo w in d icates th a t I u n d e rsta n d the a b ove in fo r m a tio n a n d agree to
p a r ticip a te in the stu d y.

Participant Signature:____________________________________

Consent Obtained By:__________________________
Initials o f researcher

Date: ___________

Date:

P lease keep the attached copy o f this form f o r yo u r records.
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Participant Number:
Data Recording Form
Cl
Pay
Condition

C2
Date

C3
Session

C4
Time off
Task
(s/60=min)

C5
Time
on
Task

(45-

C6

Cl

Total #
Checks
Complete

Checks
Correct

#

C8

C9

%
Correct
(C7/C6)

Rate
(C7/C5)

C4)

H/ I / G
H/ I / G
H/ I / G
H/ I / G
H/ I / G
H/ I / G
H/ I / G
H/ I / G
H/ I / G
H/I/G
H/ I / G
H/ I / G
H/ I / G
H/ I / G
H/ I / G
H/ I / G
H/ I / G
H/ I / G
H/ I / G
H/ I / G
H/ I / G
H/ I / G
H/ I / G
H/ I / G
H/ I / G
H/ I/ G
H/ I / G
H/ I / G
H/ I / G
H/ I / G
H/ I / G
H/ I / G
H/ I / G
H/ I / G
H/ I / G
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Preference, Satisfaction, and Stress Level Questionnaire
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Participant Number:

Preference. Satisfaction and Stress Questionnaire
Instructions: Please answer the following questions.
1. Originally, what did you believe to be the purpose of the study?

2. Now, what do you believe is the purpose of the study?

3. If your
□
□
□
□

answers to
During the
During the
During the
During the

1 & 2 are different, when did you change your belief?
Hourly pay condition
first Individual Incentive pay condition
Group Incentive pay condition
second Individual Incentive pay condition

4. Rank order the hourly pay, the individual incentive pay and the group incentive
pay in terms of how much you preferred them. Start with the one you preferred
the most.
Most preferred:
1 .________________________
2 . ________________________________________
Least preferred:
3 . ________________________
5. Please explain why you ranked them as you did:

6. Rank order the hourly pay, the individual incentive pay and the group incentive
pay in terms of how stressful they were. Start with the one that was most stressful.
Most stressful:
1 .________________________
2 . _________________________________
Least stressful:
3 .________________________
7. Please explain why you ranked them as you did:

8. Rank order the hourly pay, the individual incentive pay and the group incentive
pay in terms of how satisfied you were with them. Start with the one that was
most satisfying.
Most satisfying:
1 .________________________
2 . _________________________________
Least satisfying:
3.__ ______________________
9. Please explain why you ranked them as you did:
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10. How many other people participated in your incentive group during the Group
Incentive condition?___________ How do you know that?

11. Other comments?
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Payment Receipt for the Hourly Pay Condition
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Participant Number:
SESSION RECEIPT

Session Date:

________________

Number of Checks Completed Correctly:

Hourly Pay:

$5.75 for over 300 checks

Amount Earned:

________________
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Appendix I
Script for Pay System Description/Feedback/Alternative Activities
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Description of Pay Systems Script
Before the session begins, tell the participant what pay condition is in effect and read
the following description for that pay condition:
HOURLY PAY CONDITION: Today you will be working in the hourly pay
condition. You will be paid $5.75 for the session, provided you correctly process a
minimum of 300 checks.
INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVE CONDITION: Today you will be working in the
individual monetary incentive condition. You will be paid based on number of checks
you correctly process during this session. For every check you correctly process, you
will be paid $.006.
GROUP INCENTIVE CONDITION: Today you will be working in the group
monetary incentive condition. You will be paid based on the average number of
checks correctly processed by the group of 10 to which you are assigned. For every
check in the group average, you will be paid $.006.

Feedback Script
Before the session begins, give the subject his/her receipt for the last session and read
the following (do not read the part in parentheses during the hourly pay condition):
During your last session, t h e _________ pay condition was in
effect. You correctly pro cessed ________ checks. (The group
correctly pro cessed _________ checks.) Therefore, the amount
of money you earned for that session i s
.
If it is the first session of the week, or the first session of a new phase, tell the
participant the total pay earned during the past week and pay the participant.

Alternative Task Script
As in previous sessions, you may take work breaks whenever you like. Computer
games are available on the computer. Once during the session, I will remind you that
you may want to take a break.
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Payment Receipt for the Individual Incentive Pay Condition
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Participant Number:
SESSION RECEIPT

Session Date:

________________________________

Number of Checks Completed Correctly:

Individual Incentive Pay:

$.006 per check completed

Amount Earned:
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Appendix K
Payment Receipt for the Group Incentive Pay Condition
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Participant Number:
SESSION RECEIPT
Session Date:

________________________________

Average Number of Checks Completed Correctly by Group: ___________

Group Incentive Pay:

$.006 per check completed in group average

Amount Earned:
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Pay Scale
($0.006/check)
# Checks
100-104
105-113
114-121
122-129
130-138
139-146
147-154
155-163
164-171
172-179
180-188
189-196
197-204
205-213
214-221
222-229
230-238
239-246
247-254
255-263
264-271
272-279
280-288
289-296
297-304
305-313
314-321
322-329
330-338
339-346
347-354
355-363
364-371
372-379
380-388
389-396
397-404
405-413
414-421
422-429
430-438
439-446
447-454
455-463
464-471
472-479
480-488
489-496
497-504
505-513

Pay
$0.60
$0.65
$0.70
$0.75
$0.80
$0.85
$0.90
$0.95
$1.00
$1.05
$1.10
$1.15
$1.20
$1.25
$1.30
$1.35
$1.40
$1.45
$1.50
$1.55
$1.60
$1.65
$1.70
$1.75
$1.80
$1.85
$1.90
$1.95
$2.00
$2.05
$2.10
$2.15
$2.20
$2.25
$2.30
$2.35
$2.40
$2.45
$2.50
$2.55
$2.60
$2.65
$2.70
$2.75
$2.80
$2.85
$2.90
$2.95
$3.00
$3.05

# Checks
514-521
522-529
530-538
539-546
547-554
555-563
564-571
572-579
580-588
589-596
597-604
605-613
614-621
622-629
630-638
639-646
647-654
655-663
664-671
672-679
680-688
689-696
697-704
705-713
714-721
722-729
730-738
739-746
747-754
755-763
764-771
772-779
780-788
789-796
797-804
805-813
814-821
822-829
830-838
839-846
847-854
855-863
864-871
872-879
880-888
889-896
897-904
905-913
914-921
922-929

Pay
$3.10
$3.15
$3.20
$3.25
$3.30
$3.35
$3.40
$3.45
$3.50
$3.55
$3.60
$3.65
$3.70
$3.75
$3.80
$3.85
$3.90
$3.95
$4.00
$4.05
$4.10
$4.15
$4.20
$4.25
$4.30
$4.35
$4.40
$4.45
$4.50
$4.55
$4.60
$4.65
$4.70
$4.75
$4.80
$4.85
$4.90
$4.95
$5.00
$5.05
$5.10
$5.15
$5.20
$5.25
$5.30
$5.35
$5.40
$5.45
$5.50$5.55

# Checks
930-938
939-946
947-954
955-963
964-971
972-979
980-988
989-996
997-1004
1005-1013
1014-1021
1022-1029
1030-1038
1039-1046
1047-1054
1055-1063
1064-1071
1072-1079
1191-1199
1080-1088
1089-1096
1097-1104
1105-1113
1114-1121
1122-1129
1130-1138
1139-1146
1147-1154
1155-1163
1164-1171
1172-1179
1180-1188
1189-1196
1197-1204
1205-1213
1214-1221
1222-1229
1230-1238
1239-1246
1247-1254
1255-1263
1263-1271
1272-1279
1280-1288
1289-1296
1297-1304
1305-1313
1314-1321
1322-1329
1330-1338

Pay
$5.60
$5.65
$5.70
$5.75
$5.80
$5.85
$5.90
$5.95
$6.00
$6.05
$6.10
$6.15
$6.20
$6.25
$6.30
$6.35
$6.40
$6.45
$6.50
$6.55
$6.60
$6.65
$6.70
$6.75
$6.80
$6.85
$6.90
$6.95
$7.00
$7.05
$7.10
$7.15
$7.20
$7.25
$7.30
$7.35
$7.40
$7.45
$7.50
$7.55
$7.60
$7.65
$7.70
$7.75
$7.80
$7.85
$7.90
$7.95
$8.00
$8.05
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Appendix M
Debriefing Script
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Debriefing Script
Following the last session of participation:
1. Thank the subject for participating in the research study.
2. Explain the purpose of the study as follows:
A. Previous research has demonstrated that when people are paid
individual or group monetary incentives, they perform better than when
they are paid hourly rates.
B. Studies that have compared performance under individual and group
monetary incentives have had mixed results. For example, some studies
have found no differences in performance when individuals have been
exposed to both group and individual monetary incentives. Other studies
have found that performance is lower when individuals are paid group
incentives than when they are paid individual incentives.
C. One reason for these conflicting results may be that, in some of the
studies, the performance of the group was relatively equal to the
performance of the individual (in this situation, the money earned by the
individual would have been the same under both incentive systems).
However, in other studies, the performance of the group may have been
lower than the performance of the individual (in this situation, the
individual would have earned less when paid group monetary incentives
than when paid individual monetary incentives).
D. Recent research supports the idea that high performance may decrease
when individuals are paid group monetary incentives.
E. The purpose of this study is to determine if high performance
decreases when individuals are paid group incentives as compared to
performance when individuals are paid individual incentives.
F. If high performance decreases when individuals are paid group
incentives, organizations may want to consider implementing an individual
monetary incentive system instead of a group monetary incentive system
to keep performance levels up.
G. Ask if they understand this, and/or if they have additional questions.
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3. Explain the four phases of the study as follows:
A. Phase 1 was an hourly pay condition in which you were paid $5.75 per
session, as long as you correctly completed 300 checks. In work settings,
employees must perform at minimum levels to avoid supervisory criticism and
being fired. This minimum requirement was designed to simulate that
contingency.
B. Phase 2 was an individual monetary incentive condition. In this phase, you
were paid based on how many checks you correctly processed in each session.
You were given individual feedback during this phase.
C. Phase 3 was a group monetary incentive condition. In this phase you were
paid based on how many checks the simulated group correctly processed.
However, there wasn’t actually a group and the average performance of the group
was contrived to be 25% lower than your performance.
D. Phase 4 was a reversal to individual monetary incentives with individual
feedback.
E. Ask if they understand this, and/or have additional questions.
4. Show the participant graphs of his/her performance (scores, time on task,
accuracy). Ask if the participant has questions about the graphs.
5. Explain how the participant’s performance relates to the research question (e.g.,
did the participant’s performance increase, decrease or remain the same
throughout the group incentive condition).
Ask the subject if s/he has questions regarding participation. Answer those questions.
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Research Protocol Approval
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“C e n te n n ia l
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Date:

February 25, 2004

To:

Alyce Dickinson, Principal Investigator
Kathryn Culig, Student Investigator

From: Mary Lagerwey, Ph.D., Chair
Re:

f^ j

HSIRB Project Number: 04-02-11

This letter will serve as confirmation that your research project entitled “The Effects o f
Individual Monetary Incentives with Individual Feedback and Group Monetary Incentives
with Group Feedback on High Performance” has been approved under the expedited
category o f review by the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board. The conditions
and duration o f this approval are specified in the Policies o f Western Michigan
University. You may now begin to implement the research as described in the application.
Please note that you may only conduct this research exactly in the form it was approved.
You must seek specific board approval for any changes in this project. You must also
seek reapproval if the project extends beyond the termination date noted below. In
addition if there are any unanticipated adverse reactions or unanticipated events
associated with the conduct o f this research, you should immediately suspend the project
and contact the Chair o f the HSIRB for consultation.
The Board wishes you success in the pursuit o f your research goals.

Approval Termination:

February 25, 2005

W ilnood Hill. K jljm am o , Ml < 9008-5<M
M M : <2691 387 *293 l u . (269) 381-1276
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UNIVERSITY^
Hum an S u b je c ts In s titu tio n a l R e vie w B oa rd

.Hrbt.itiou

Date: August 9, 2004
-To:

Alyce Dickinson, Principal Investigator
Kathryn Culig, Student Investigator

From: Amy Naugle, Interim Ch
Re:

HSERB Project Number: U4-U2-11

This letter will serve as confirmation that the changes to your research project “The Effects of
Individual Monetary Incentives with Individual Feedback and Group Monetary Incentives with
Group Feedback” requested in your memo dated August 3, 2004 have been approved by the
Human Subjects Institutional Review Board.
The conditions and the duration of this approval are specified in the Policies o f Western
Michigan University.
Please note that you may only conduct this research exactly in the form it was approved. You
must seek specific board approval for any changes in this project. You must also seek reapproval
if the project extends beyond the termination date noted below. In addition if there are any
unanticipated adverse reactions or unanticipated events associated with the conduct o f this
research, you should immediately suspend the project and contact the Chair o f the HSIRB for
consultation.
The Board wishes you success in the pursuit o f your research goals.

Approval Termination: February 25, 2005
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